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통화정책 투명성과 희생비율

Monetary Transparency and the Sacrifice Ratio

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키워드

주제분류경제학

초록

본 연구는 92개국의 패널자료를 이용하여 통화정책 투명성이 높아질 때 디스인플레이션 정책이 초래하는 실업률 증가의 크기, 즉 희생비율을 한계적으로 축소시킬 수 있음을 실증적으로 보인다. 이러한 연구결과는 인플레이션과 고용(성장) 간의 상충관계를 개선시킬 수 있다는 점에서, 통화정책의 효율성 제고뿐 아니라 외환시장 혹은 국제수지 등 여타 경제목표를 고려해야 하는 통화당국에게 보다 큰 정책운영상의 여지가 있을 수 있음을 시사한다.

Abstract

This study empirically verifies that monetary transparency can reduce the sacrifice ratio, the employment cost of disinflation, based on the panel data of 92 countries. This result has a significant implication on the efficiency of monetary policy in not only that monetary transparency is able to improve the trade-off between inflation and employment, but that it can provide a more room for the monetary authority that has to take into consideration other economic policy goals like the balance of payments and foreign exchange market variables.

참고문헌 (48)

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