자연재해보험시장에서 역선택의 존재와 원인에 대한 실증연구
An Empirical Study on the Existence and Cause of Adverse Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets
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기상이변에 의한 태풍, 호우, 강풍 등의 자연재해가 증가에 대응하여 한국에서는 2001년부터 농작물재해보험, 풍수해보험, 양식수산물재해보험 등 자연재해보험을 도입하여 왔다. 자연재해보험시장에서는 역선택이 존재하는 경우 고위험 농민만 보험을 구입하게 되어 보험사업의 지속성 유지가 어렵게 될 수 있다. 본 연구의 목적은 자연재해보험 중 대표적인 농작물재해보험시장에서 역선택의 존재와 원인에 대한 실증분석을 실시한 후 향후 대응방안을 제시하는 것이다. 역선택의 존재를 확인하기 위하여 모수적 방법과 비모수적 방법을 사용하여 보험계약자의 보험가입금액 고액화 의사(보험가입금액 감액 변수)와 보험계약을 통한 이익(보험인센티브 변수)간 조건부 독립성을 검정하였다. 검정결과, 독립성 가설이 기각됨에 따라 두 변수는 상관관계가 인정되고 역선택은 존재하는 것으로 나타났다. 보험가입금액을 높게 설정할 의사가 있는 보험계약자일수록 더 많은 보험인센티브를 받고 있음을 의미한다. 역선택 원인 및 학습효과에 대한 확인을 위한 패널로짓분석의 결과는 단위면적당 수확량이 큰 보험계약자일수록 역선택의 가능성이 높고, 학습효과는 없는 것으로 분석되었다. 자연재해보험시장에서 역선택을 완화하기 위해서는 정보비대칭 개선, 보험계약가치의 균등화를 위한 보험인센티브에 대한 점검, 자연재해위험에 대한 예측력 강화 등 보험자의 지속적 노력이 필요하다.
Abstract
The Korean government has introduced a natural disaster insurance products since 2001 to cope with increasing natural disasters such as typhoon, torrential rain, heavy storm, etc, which were caused by unpredictable climate changes and, until now, crop insurance, flood-storm insurance and aquaculture insurance are introduced. If adverse selection exists in the natural disaster insurance market, the farmers with higher risk only tend to buy this insurance which will end up harming sustainability of insurance business. The purpose of this study is to analyze empirically whether and why adverse selection exists in the crop insurance market, the biggest one among natural disaster insurance markets and also to propose improvements against the adverse selection in the future. To find out the existence of adverse selection in the insurance market, parametric and non-parametric methods were applied when testing the conditional independence between the insured amount maximization variable and the insurance incentive variable. The result reveals that hypothesis of conditional independence is rejected, which implies two variables are correlated. This finding indicates that and adverse selection exists and the insured with the intention of the higher insured amount actually receives the more insurance incentives. Panel logit model, used to find the cause and learning effect of adverse selection in the insurance market, reveals that the farmers with a high unit-production have higher possibility of adverse selection but with no learning effect. To maintain a long term growth in natural disaster insurance market, an insurer needs to make continuous efforts discouraging adverse selection by the means of minimizing information asymmetry, reviewing the insurance incentive and enforcing natural disaster forecast system.
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