자동차보험시장의 역선택에 관한 동태적 실증 분석*
A Dynamic Empirical Analysis of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market
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최근 자동차보험시장에 역선택이 존재하는지의 여부에 대하여 국내·외에서 다수의 실증연구가 진행되었으나, 아직 그 결과는 명확하게 밝혀지지 않고 있다. 국가별 제도의 상이 및 데이터의 불충분에 기인한 것으로 판단된다. 본 연구는 우리나라에서 자동차보험을 영위하고 있는 모든 보험회사의 데이터를 토대로 패널자료를 통한 동태적 분석을 시도함으로써 선행연구의 한계성을 극복하고자 하였다. 본 연구의 주요 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 우리나라 자동차보험시장에 있어 역선택의 존재 여부는 전위험담보를 종속변수로 사용한 모형에서는 역선택이 존재하는 것으로 나타났으나, 자기부담금을 종속변수로 사용한 모형에서는 역선택이 존재하지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 역선택의 경우에는 보험계약자의 학습효과가 존재하지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 할인･할증제도에 의한 보험료 인상 효과가 역선택과 학습의 효과를 상쇄하는 데 기인하는 것으로 판단된다.
Abstract
Recently, numerous studies have been continuously conducted in order to prove the existence of adverse selection. However, there is yet no clear conclusion as to whether adverse selection does exist in the automobile insurance market. This paper overcomes the limitation of data encountered in the previous researches by conducting a dynamic empirical analysis based on the panel database of all automobile insurers operating in Korea. The main results of this paper are as follows. First, as for the existence of adverse selection in the Korean automobile insurance, in the model where insurance coverage is used as a dependent variable, adverse selection does exist. However, in the model where deductible is used as a dependent variable, adverse selection does not exist. Second, learning effect of the insured does not exist in case of adverse selection. It can be judged that the rise in the cost of insurance through the bonus-malus system offsets the effects resulting from adverse selection and learning effect.
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