An Investigation of the Optimal Closed-Loop Supply Chain for Electronic Products
0
조회
0
다운로드
1
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
The global expansion of the electronic product markets combined with an imperfect recycling system led to the increased production of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) and environmental pollution. As such, a growing number of countries are becoming aware of the importance of WEEE recycling to environmental protection, and they exert efforts to formulate related legislation. This study investigates the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), which recycles WEEE through third-party recyclers. The manufacturers in the CLSC employ the recycled part of WEEE to produce remanufactured items, while they use new components to produce new items. However, consumers’ low willingness to pay (WTP) for remanufactured items makes the profitability of recycling and remanufacturing WEEE questionable. We examine three types of CLSC decision-making models, including decentralized, centralized, and coordination models, to investigate how government intervention and consumers’ WTP for remanufactured items influence the CLSC decisions and CLSC members’ profits. The results provide implications regarding the impact of government subsidies and consumers’ WTP for remanufactured items on the CLSC decisions. The results indicate that the centralized CLSC is more profitable than the decentralized CLSC, and that the coordination model with revenue sharing contract and quantity discount contract can effectively manage the CLSC.
Abstract
The global expansion of the electronic product markets combined with an imperfect recycling system led to the increased production of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) and environmental pollution. As such, a growing number of countries are becoming aware of the importance of WEEE recycling to environmental protection, and they exert efforts to formulate related legislation. This study investigates the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), which recycles WEEE through third-party recyclers. The manufacturers in the CLSC employ the recycled part of WEEE to produce remanufactured items, while they use new components to produce new items. However, consumers’ low willingness to pay (WTP) for remanufactured items makes the profitability of recycling and remanufacturing WEEE questionable. We examine three types of CLSC decision-making models, including decentralized, centralized, and coordination models, to investigate how government intervention and consumers’ WTP for remanufactured items influence the CLSC decisions and CLSC members’ profits. The results provide implications regarding the impact of government subsidies and consumers’ WTP for remanufactured items on the CLSC decisions. The results indicate that the centralized CLSC is more profitable than the decentralized CLSC, and that the coordination model with revenue sharing contract and quantity discount contract can effectively manage the CLSC.
참고문헌 (28)
- Abbey, J. D., "The Role of Perceived Quality Risk in Pricing Remanufactured Products", Production and Operations Management, 26(1), pp.100~115 (2017)
- Atasu, A., "Efficient Take-Back Legislation", Production and Operations Management, 18(3), pp.243~258 (2009)
- "The Global E-Waste Monitor 2017: Quantities, Flows and Resources" (2017)[URL]
- Chen, X., "The Pricing and Coordination of Closed-Loop CLSC with Government Subsidies", Cooperation Economics and Technology, 8(4), pp.70~72 (2017)
- Choi, S. C., "Price Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer", Marketing Science, 10(4), pp.271~296 (1991)
- Choi, T. M., "Channel Leadership, Performance and Coordination in Closed Loop CLSCs", International Journal of Production Economics, 146(1), pp.371~380 (2013)
- Ferrer, G., "Managing New and Differentiated Remanufactured Products", European Journal of Operational Research, 203(2), pp.370~379 (2010)
- Quality Management Requirements For Machinery Products Remanufacturing, "General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China (AQSIQ)", ~, pp.Report No. GB (2014), T 31207-2014
- Geylani, T., "Strategic Manufacturer Response to a Dominant Retailer", Marketing Science, 26(2), pp.164~178 (2007)
- Giuntini, R., "Remanufacturing:The Next Great Opportunity for Boosting US Productivity", Business Horizons, 46(6), pp.41~48 (2003)
- Govindan, K., "Reverse CLSC Coordination by Revenue Sharing Contract: A Case for the Personal Computers Industry", European Journal of Operational Research, 233(2), pp.326~336 (2014)
- Guide, Jr, V. D. R., "The Potential for Cannibalization of New Products Sales by Remanufactured Products", Decision Sciences, 41(3), pp.547~572 (2010)
- Guo, J., "Pricing Strategies and Coordination Mechanism of Closed-Loop Remanufacturing CLSC with WTP Differentiation", Journal of System Management, 21(5), pp.617~624 (2012)
- Hammond, D., "Closed-Loop CLSC Network Equilibrium under Legislation", European Journal of Operational Research, 183(2), pp.895~908 (2007)
- Heydari, J., "Reverse and Closed Loop CLSC Coordination by Considering Government Role", Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 52, pp.379~398 (2017)
- 김성기, "순환형 공급사슬 관련 정책 대안에 관한 연구: 생산자책임재활용제도를 중심으로", 한국생산관리학회지, 30(1), pp.39~65 (2019), 한국생산관리학회[DOI]
- 이돈희, "지속가능 SCM 실행과 환경정책이 환경성과에 미치는 영향: 한국과 미국기업을 중심으로", 한국생산관리학회지, 28(4), pp.433~456 (2017), 한국생산관리학회[DOI]
- 이상만, "공급망 관리(SCM) 파트너십이 기업의 경영성과에 미치는 영향", 한국생산관리학회지, 18(3), pp.105~133 (2007), 한국생산관리학회[DOI]
- Michaud, C., "Green Consumer Behaviour : An Experimental Analysis of Willingness to Pay for Remanufactured Products", Business Strategy and the Environment, 20(6), pp.408~420 (2011)
- Mitra, S., "Competition in Remanufacturing and the Effects of Government Subsidies", International Journal of Production Economics, 111(2), pp.287~298 (2008)
- Savaskan, R. C., "Closed-Loop CLSC Models with Product Remanufacturing", Management Science, 50(2), pp.239~252 (2004)
- Wang, W., "Reward-Penalty Mechanism for a Two-Period Closed-Loop CLSC", Journal of Cleaner Production, 203, pp.898~917 (2018)
- Wang, W., "Reward-Penalty Mechanism in a Closed-Loop CLSC with Sequential Manufacturers’Price Competition", Journal of Cleaner Production, 168, pp.118~130 (2017)
- Wang, W., "Closed-Loop CLSCs under Reward-Penalty Mechanism: Retailer Collection and Asymmetric Information", Journal of Cleaner Production, 142, pp.3938~3955 (2017)
- Wang, W., "Reward-Penalty Mechanism for Closed-Loop CLSCs under Responsibility-Sharing and Different Power Structures", International Journal of Production Economics, 170, pp.178~190 (2015)
- Weng, Z. K, "Channel Coordination and Quantity Discounts", Management Science, 41(9), pp.1509~1522 (1995)
- 유승호, "리퍼비싱을 고려한 불완전 품질 재고모형", 한국생산관리학회지, 27(4), pp.427~442 (2016), 한국생산관리학회[DOI]
- 유승호, "회수보장 및 재활용이 제품 품질, 가격 및 반품 정책에 미치는 영향", 한국생산관리학회지, 28(4), pp.457~473 (2017), 한국생산관리학회[DOI]