방산업체의 원가이전에 관한 연구
A Study on the Defense Industrial Company's Cost Transfer
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The method that the defense industrial company seeks to gain profit is a cost compensation type of approximate contract, in which the Ministry of National Defense calculates the company's real production cost and then imposes a certain percentage of profit rate to set the contract cost. By doing so, if the purchasing of defense supplies is set out in the method of a cost compensation type of approximate contract, the defense industrial company will be able to transfer the production cost from the field of civilian demands to defense by exaggerating the budget or using ways that can create avoidable production costs(Rogerson 1992). This study uses Yetman(2001) and Hoffman(2007)'s regression analysis of the total cost model to estimate the cost ratio figures of civilian demand field and defense field and verifies the relations between the two fields regarding their transfer of production cost. As a result, this study was able to find out the difference between the defense industrial company's reported production cost and estimated production cost in the field of defense. There was positive(+) difference between the two production costs and as the sales of civilian demand field's was of greater importance, this difference gap got wider. Moreover, the study could find a distinct difference in the production cost transfer during the postwar period in 2003, when there was a revision on the production cost's standard guidelines. This study is an extended version of a previous study done on production cost transfer regarding the defense industry. The difference between this study and others is that unlike other previous studies that use profitability, generated cost and labor cost rate to indirectly give grounds on the production cost transfer, it calculates the reported cost's ratio figures which allow a more direct method of analyzing the transfer of the production cost. The verification of the production cost transfer phenomenon has a political significance in that it can improve the government's negotiating power and adduce the basis for bringing about a standard that can efficiently estimate the production cost.
Abstract
The method that the defense industrial company seeks to gain profit is a cost compensation type of approximate contract, in which the Ministry of National Defense calculates the company's real production cost and then imposes a certain percentage of profit rate to set the contract cost. By doing so, if the purchasing of defense supplies is set out in the method of a cost compensation type of approximate contract, the defense industrial company will be able to transfer the production cost from the field of civilian demands to defense by exaggerating the budget or using ways that can create avoidable production costs(Rogerson 1992). This study uses Yetman(2001) and Hoffman(2007)'s regression analysis of the total cost model to estimate the cost ratio figures of civilian demand field and defense field and verifies the relations between the two fields regarding their transfer of production cost. As a result, this study was able to find out the difference between the defense industrial company's reported production cost and estimated production cost in the field of defense. There was positive(+) difference between the two production costs and as the sales of civilian demand field's was of greater importance, this difference gap got wider. Moreover, the study could find a distinct difference in the production cost transfer during the postwar period in 2003, when there was a revision on the production cost's standard guidelines. This study is an extended version of a previous study done on production cost transfer regarding the defense industry. The difference between this study and others is that unlike other previous studies that use profitability, generated cost and labor cost rate to indirectly give grounds on the production cost transfer, it calculates the reported cost's ratio figures which allow a more direct method of analyzing the transfer of the production cost. The verification of the production cost transfer phenomenon has a political significance in that it can improve the government's negotiating power and adduce the basis for bringing about a standard that can efficiently estimate the production cost.
참고문헌 (26)
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