심즉리(心卽理)의 출현- 「존재의 대연쇄」와 「의인화」를 중심으로

Abstract

This paper addresses a phicosophical issue from the theoretical standpoint called Cognitive Confucianism. How are we supposed to understand that a person who says to be a follower of Zhu Xi also claims Zhu Xi’s opposite theory, ‘Heart-Mind is Principle’? In particular I will refer to three distinctive scenes that appear in the history of Korean Confucianism associating them with a few cognitive instruments. The three scenes are the conception of shangdi (上帝) that can be found in Yi Hwang’s Libalsul (The theory of the arousal of principle: 理發說), the coined word ‘mibalsimchae’ (The not-yet-aroused state of the substance of heart-mind: 未發心體’) that the Yulgok scholars made in 18th century, and Yi Jinsang’s theory of ‘Heart-Mind is Principle.’ On the other hand, the cognitive instruments that are needed in our discussion are the cognitive model called ‘the great chain of being’, conceptual metaphor called ‘X is a human’, and image schemas that are related to those—‘the up-down schema’ and ‘the in-out schema.’ In this paper I will argue that ‘the highest categories of the conceptions in neo-Confucian discussions were anthropomorphized’ as a result of the phenomena that ‘cognitive instruments were associated with neo-Confucian thoughts’ and that ‘the theory of ‘Heart-Mind is Principle’ appeared in the debate as an exemplary case of ‘X is a human.’’ The phenomenon that what is inside us changes its location and becomes the owner could be said as a sort of a philosophical trial to change a ground of value for life from a transcendental thing to an ‘a priori’ thing.