소프트웨어 플랫폼 시장의 특성과 독점규제소송에서의 주요 쟁점
A Study on the Characteristics of Software Platform Market and Issues on Antitrust Law
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A software platform market has various characteristics that differ it from a general market. It is easy to form a monopoly market due to its economies of scale, network effect, and lock-in effect, resulting in more various illegal acts. On the other hand, with its continuous changing and developing feature, it is possible to reduce the incentive for the development of new technology by strictly applying the antitrust law on intellectual property right that protects the software. Furthermore, because it also has the characteristic of platform or two-sided market that are being issues among economics, applying the antitrust law on the software platform market is rather containing some complicated problems. On this paper, after I specified and systematized the characteristics of the software platform market, I analyzed how these characteristics were claimed by a concerned party in a lawsuit about the antitrust law, and how the courthouse was accepting it. Furthermore, I asserted reflecting the various platform market's characteristics fairly in the antitrust policy and execution process, and considering the changes of web-based platform environment and software business model.
Abstract
A software platform market has various characteristics that differ it from a general market. It is easy to form a monopoly market due to its economies of scale, network effect, and lock-in effect, resulting in more various illegal acts. On the other hand, with its continuous changing and developing feature, it is possible to reduce the incentive for the development of new technology by strictly applying the antitrust law on intellectual property right that protects the software. Furthermore, because it also has the characteristic of platform or two-sided market that are being issues among economics, applying the antitrust law on the software platform market is rather containing some complicated problems. On this paper, after I specified and systematized the characteristics of the software platform market, I analyzed how these characteristics were claimed by a concerned party in a lawsuit about the antitrust law, and how the courthouse was accepting it. Furthermore, I asserted reflecting the various platform market's characteristics fairly in the antitrust policy and execution process, and considering the changes of web-based platform environment and software business model.
참고문헌 (18)
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