退溪･栗谷 性理說의 재조명과 그 止揚 방향

Abstract

The debate between Toegye and Yulgok can be summarized into two issues. One is how to understand the structure of mind? the other is whether li is an agent capable of the initiative. However, Toegye’s thesis holding that li is capable of the initiatives violates the essential dichotomy between physical ki and metaphysical li and, as a result, faces criticisms even within his own school. This paper agrees with the criticism, arguing that the mind as the essence of ki is the sole agent capable of the initiative. Once the li-capability thesis is rejected, the genuine issue in the debate is how to understand the structure of the mind. Concerning the structure of the mind, Toegye’s ‘li and ki mutually initiate’(理氣互發) reflects the ‘two-natures-two-feelings’ thesis, whereas Yulgok’s ‘ki initiates and li is carried by ki’s initiative following one route’(氣發理乘一途) reflects the ‘one-nature-one-feeling’ thesis. As Toegye and Yulgok agree that the moral mind, the four beginnings, are from the moral nature, the point in question is the source of the human mind. Toegye holds that the source of the human mind is the privacy and partiality of one's physical ki, while Yulgok maintains that (like the moral mind) the human mind also comes from the moral nature of human beings. Here, Yulgok also violates one of the major premises of ZhuXi school. This paper holds that all emotions, including the moral mind, the human mind, the four beginnings, and the seven feelings, are initiated by the perceptional process of the mind and that the moral mind and the human mind are different in terms of their sources and orientations. Based on that, this paper proposes a thesis of ‘ki initiates and both ki and li are carried by ki’s initiative following two routes’(氣發互乘兩途).