표준특허 FRAND 확약의 계약법적 효력
The FRAND Commitment As a Binding Contract
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FRAND 확약 위반의 표준특허침해금지 청구에 대해 경쟁법에 의한 규제는 원칙적으로 바람직하지 못하고 특허권 남용 항변으로 대처하는 것도 실효성을 기대하기 어렵다는 지적이 유력하다. 따라서 FRAND 확약을 계약으로 보고서 표준특허침해금지 청구를 계약위반의 항변으로 대처할 수 없는지 검토할 필요가 있다. 미국의 1심법원에서는 FRAND 확약으로 제3자를 위한 계약이 성립했다고 보는 것이 이미 지배적인 견해가 되었지만 국내에서는 FRAND 확약을 계약으로 보는 데 회의적인 입장이 우세한 듯하다. 따라서 이 글은 우선 제3자를 위한 계약이 성립했다고 보는 미국 판례의 이론적 근거를 규명하고 대륙법계 국가에서 FRAND 확약의 계약법적 효력이 인정될 수 있을지 여부에 관련된, 기존의 학설 및 판례를 검토한 다음 대륙법계 국가의 법원에서 제3자를 위한 계약설을 수용할 수 있다면 그 근거가 무엇일지 찾아보고 마지막으로 RAND 확약으로 제3자를 위한 계약이 성립하는가 여부에 관해 우리나라를 비롯한 대륙법계 국가들의 계약법을 적용한다고 가정하더라도 반드시 미국의 판례와 전혀 다른 결론이 도출되어야 하는 것은 아니라는 결론을 도출하였다.
Abstract
The complexity of standards in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) creates a tension between the need to reward the owners of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) that may cover standard specifications and the need to make standards available to all for public use. In the last few years, this tension has crystallized into a difficult debate on the legal nature of the SEP(standard essential patent) owners’ FRAND commitments. Recourse to injunctions and monetary damages are legitimate remedies for the infringement of a patent in all significant jurisdictions, irrespective of whether the patent is standard essential or not and irrespective of whether a FRAND-commitment has been given. But in nearly all jurisdictions that had to deal with SEP-cases so far, courts have been evaluating the compliance with FRAND commitment before issuing an injunction. While the exact conditions under which a license seeking party can avoid an injunction for the infringement of a FRAND-committed SEP vary amongst the jurisdictions and largely depend on the conduct of the parties leading to and during the negotiations as well as the content of the offers made by each party in the concrete case at hand, the various decisions are nevertheless increasingly consistent when it comes to evaluating parties’ behaviour in FRAND disputes under the rubric of good faith. As it comes to the activities by the antitrust agencies on both sides of the Atlantic, their assessment depends upon the assumption that the mere seeking of injunctive relief, without more, is itself anticompetitive. But this approach seems to contradict the general principle that the mere fact of exercising a legal right and asking for relief in a competent national court is typically not a competition law violation in and of itself. Contract law and Patent Law are possibilities if the SEP is encumbered by a FRAND obligation. In the United States and other common law countries, courts may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity on such terms as the court deems reasonable. But in most continental European countries and other significant jurisdictions including Korea, there is no judicial discretion in relation to the grant of an injunction for infringement of an IPR. Other than in exceptional cases, injunctions follow as a matter of law or automatically after a finding of infringement. Therefor Contract Law may be the best solution in these countries. If the SEP is encumbered by a FRAND obligation, the court may read that obligation as conferring enforceable third-party rights to avoid injunctive relief upon payment of the FRAND royalty. Whether this is a reasonable interpretation of a given FRAND commitment will depend on the wording of that commitment and on the substantive law of the country by which the contract is to be interpreted. In this paper, I present my analysis of the possibilities that FRAND commitment could be seen as a binding contract for the benefit of third parties in the Korean legal perspective.
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