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영미법상의 司法政策的 관점에서 본 경영판단 원칙의 변화단계 연구 － 미국 델라웨어 州 판결의 역사를 중심으로 －

A Study on the Stages of Change in the Business Judgment Rule from the Perspective of Common Law Judicial Policy

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한국경영법률학회 (The Korean Academic Society Of Business Administration And Law)|2010.04|경영법률 (Journal of Business Administration & Law)|제20권 제3호|pp. 27-65

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참고문헌

키워드

경영판단의 원칙(Business Judgment Rule)충실의무(Duty of Loyalty)영미법(Common Law)사법정책(Judicial Policy)주의의무(Duty of Care)신인의무(Fiduciary Duty)선의(good faith)중과실(Gross Negligence)사법정책적 편의주의(Opportunism of Judicial Policy)사법정책적 목적주의(Intentionalism of Judicial Policy)
주제분류법학

초록

The change in corporate governance law influences not only each individual corporation but also a country’s economy. The Delaware courts have reduced the liabilities of corporate directors for about ninety years and established the most liberal corporate law in the United States. Today, Delaware is the sole winner of the U.S. corporate law market and has many economic advantages, such as initial incorporation taxes, annual franchise taxes, the prestige of being the biggest corporate law market in the United States, and so on. Today, in my opinion, the “duty of loyalty” and the “duty of care,” the twin pillars of the “fiduciary duty” of directors’ liabilities in the Delaware business judgment rule, are virtually extinct, with the exception of their names. In my opinion, this is, from the Delaware courts’ standpoint, a so-called opportunism of judicial policy and intentionalism of judicial policy. Judicial policies of Delaware courts are expected to continue when we consider Delaware’s endeavor for about ninety years to maintain a most liberal corporate law in the United States. Moreover, the U.S. Congress and federal government of the U.S. are expected to not interfere in this situation except in the event of a big scandal, because they have a good understanding of the merits and efficiency of competing U.S. corporate law system. However, in my opinion, Delaware’s judicial policy cannot continue forever, because the “business judgment rule” cannot be a so-called business judgment no liability rule, though Delaware’s corporate law has several merits.

Abstract

The change in corporate governance law influences not only each individual corporation but also a country’s economy. The Delaware courts have reduced the liabilities of corporate directors for about ninety years and established the most liberal corporate law in the United States. Today, Delaware is the sole winner of the U.S. corporate law market and has many economic advantages, such as initial incorporation taxes, annual franchise taxes, the prestige of being the biggest corporate law market in the United States, and so on. Today, in my opinion, the “duty of loyalty” and the “duty of care,” the twin pillars of the “fiduciary duty” of directors’ liabilities in the Delaware business judgment rule, are virtually extinct, with the exception of their names. In my opinion, this is, from the Delaware courts’ standpoint, a so-called opportunism of judicial policy and intentionalism of judicial policy. Judicial policies of Delaware courts are expected to continue when we consider Delaware’s endeavor for about ninety years to maintain a most liberal corporate law in the United States. Moreover, the U.S. Congress and federal government of the U.S. are expected to not interfere in this situation except in the event of a big scandal, because they have a good understanding of the merits and efficiency of competing U.S. corporate law system. However, in my opinion, Delaware’s judicial policy cannot continue forever, because the “business judgment rule” cannot be a so-called business judgment no liability rule, though Delaware’s corporate law has several merits.

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