WTO와 국제노동기준

Abstract

Attempts to integrate labour rights into the multilateral world trading and financial systems have so far failed. A direct link between international trade and labour conditions was recognised in Article 7 of the draft Charter of the International Trade Organisation(ITO) signed in Havana in 1948 by 53 countries. Although the Havana Charter was never ratified and the ITO was stillborn, Article 7 of the draft Charter proved to be influential in post-war trade agreements, such as the International Sugar Agreement of 1953 under which the parties agreed. No specific provision relating labour standards was made in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), an inter- governmental treaty incorporating the commercial policy chapter of the Havana Charter. The only exception is Article XX(e) which allows prohibition on the import of products of prison labour. The GATT 1994, updating the 1947 treaty made no changes in this or other respects. We shall see that attempts to interpret the GATT so as to permit trade measures for non-observance of labour standards are likely to collide with the non-discrimination principles on which the GATT is based. Moreover, the general exceptions and safeguards provisions of the GATT do not appear to be apt to allow trade measures for breach of labour standards. An explicit amendment to the GATT would be required, but there is no political consensus to bring this about. During the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1973-79) the United States raised the issue of labour standards, but failed to gain support. The reciprocal allegations between developed and developing countries of social dumping and protectionism surfaced again during the Uruguay Round (1986-94). The United States requested that a working group be formed to study the issue. Although this had the support of the EU, the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand, some Eastern European countries and Japan, no agreement could be reached. The issue was again put on the agenda at the WTO ministerial conference in Singapore in 1996 by the United States, France and Canada. The Ministerial Declaration at the end of that conference, while renewing the commitment 'to observance of internationally recognised core standards'. said that the ILO 'is the competent body to set and deal with these standards'. The Ministers in effect accepted the position of the developing countries, and rejected 'the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes'. They stated that 'the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question'. The approach of the WTO ministers, was echoed in paragraph 5 of the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998). Attempts led by the United States to revive the issue at the Seattle(1999), Doha (2001) and Cancun (2003) Ministerial Conferences also failed. Article 33 of the ILO Constitution authorities 'action', possibly including economic sanctions, against Member States that fail to observe their obligations. A controversial issue is whether such sanctions would be compatible with the obligations undertaken by WTO Member States. Similarly, WTO rules throw into doubt the legality of unilateral trade sanctions under the US GSP and EU GSP. This Paper examines these complex, and as yet unresolved issues, and discusses the limits of WTO institutions as potential protectors of labour rights.