한국 재벌기업의 자본조달순위이론 검증
Pecking Order Theory and Korean Chaebol Firms
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초록
본 연구는 한국 재벌기업을 대상으로 자본조달순위이론이 성립하는가를 검증하고, 한국 재벌기업이 자본조달순위이론을 따른다면 정보비대칭의 수준에 따라 자본조달순위이론에 대한 순응도가 달라지는가를 분석하였다. 분석기간은 2001년부터 2011년까지 총 11개년이고 표본기업은 재벌기업 1,051개, 비재벌기업 3,354개 등 총 4,405개이다. 실증분석 결과 한국 재벌기업은 재무의사결정에서 자본조달순위이론을 따르는 것으로 분석되었다. 그렇지만 자본구조 의사결정에서 정보비대칭이 중요한 영향요인 인지는 명확하지 않았다. 정보비대칭 수준에 따른 자본조달순위이론의 순응도 분석에서는 명확한 영향관계를 확인할 수 없었다. 이와는 달리 비재벌기업에서는 자본조달순위이론의 성립과 함께 자본조달순위이론의 핵심가정인 정보비대칭이 자본구조를 결정하는 중요 요인임을 확인할 수 있었다. 정보비대칭 수준이 증가하면 처음에는 자본조달순위이론의 순응도가 증가하다가 일정수준 이상이 되면 순응도가 낮아지는 역U자형 관계로 분석되었다. 이러한 분석결과를 종합해 보면, 기업규모가 크고 시장의 감시에 더 많이 노출되는 재벌기업의 경우에는 자본조달순위이론에 따라 자금조달 의사결정이 이루어지지만 자본조달순위이론에 대한 순응도는 낮은 것으로 이해할 수 있었다. 반면에 정보비대칭의 정도가 높은 비재벌기업은 정보비대칭문제가 자본구조를 결정하는 중요 영향요인으로 작용하고 자본조달순위이론의 순응도는 정보비대칭의 정도에 따라 달라진다는 것을 알 수 있었다.
Abstract
The problem of explaining firms’ capital structure is intensely debated in corporate finance. One of the most popular models of corporate financing decisions in the literature is the pecking order theory of Myers(1984). It is based on the argument in Myers and Majluf(1984) that asymmetric information problems drive the capital structure of firms. We test whether information asymmetry is an important determinant of capital structure decisions in Korean Chaebol firms, as suggested by the pecking order theory, using a novel information asymmetry index based on measures of adverse selection developed by the market microstructure literature. The empirical results are as follows. Firstly, we find that information asymmetry and pecking order theory affect the capital structure decisions of Korean Chaebol and non-Chaebol firms over the sample period 2001-2011. Our findings are robust to controlling for conventional leverage factors(financing deficit, tangibility, MB ratio, size, profitability, ownership structure). Secondary, we find a non-linear inverse U-shaped relation between leverage and information asymmetry in non-Chaebol firms, but can not find effective relationship in Chaebol firms. As the information asymmetry increases from a low level, non-Chaebol firms has incentive to increase leverage. However, when information asymmetry increases a significant level, non-Chaebol firms' managers have incentive to decrease the debt level.
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