Optimal Contracts for Risk Managers
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This study analyzed the principal-agent problem, in which the agent performs risk management tasks, and considered the cost minimization problem of the principal, the objective of which is to design the cheapest contract inducing a target effort. Our results confirm that a one-step bonus contract should be used, which means that a bonus contract is most efficient for the principal in terms of incentive provision. A new condition to justify the first-order approach in our model was also provided.
Abstract
This study analyzed the principal-agent problem, in which the agent performs risk management tasks, and considered the cost minimization problem of the principal, the objective of which is to design the cheapest contract inducing a target effort. Our results confirm that a one-step bonus contract should be used, which means that a bonus contract is most efficient for the principal in terms of incentive provision. A new condition to justify the first-order approach in our model was also provided.
참고문헌 (16)
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