베다우의 약한 창발론에서 복잡성과 관련된 문제

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to answer two questions that are easily raised in Bedau's discussion of weak emrgentism, and to look at the additional problems with the levelism behind them. Bedau calls certain macro-level properties weakly emergent properties, which can only be identified by simulations or crawling the micro-causal web, due to the high complexity of the state of micro level. Weak emergentism has two advantages over the existing strong emergentism. The first is that it is compatible with the materialism and reductionism, and the second is that at the same time, while satisfying the first, weak emergentism can be ontological emergentism. However, some raise the following questions against Bedau’s claim. First, strictly following Bedau's definition of weak emergence, we conclude that only a complete random system is weakly emergent that is not interesting to us. Second, it is doubtful that while a weakly emergent ones can be reduced to the micro level components that make up it, and at the same time has an ontologically independent status. I will show that both problems stem from misunderstanding of Bedau's argument. The first problem stems from a misunderstanding of the complexity concept, and the second problem stems from a misunderstanding of the reduction concept and macro entities. However, these problems stem from Bedau's ambiguous view of his complexity concept. In response, Bernstein supplements Bedau's discussion using the concept of complexity information theory. However, I think Bernstein's method is not enough as the ultimate solution. This is because the problem about ontological emergentism is not just the reality of complexity, but fundamentalist levelism itself is the core of the problem. In conclusion, I propose that in order for reality in emergentism and emergentism to have meaning, the meaning of levelism and the terms 'ontological (realistic)' must be changed.