家康 국서문제의 僞造 및 改作과 동아시아

Abstract

After the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592, which is called the Imjin War (壬辰戰爭), both Joseon and Japan realized that they required a peace overture between them, and then should resume diplomatic relations in order to build a stable system following the end of the war. Then, they tried a diplomatic touch. Consequently, Joseon sent the first Reply and Prisoner Repatriation Envoy (回答兼刷還使) to Japan in 1607 as the Joseon policy toward Japan for reducing economic and military burdens after searching for situations in Japan and considering Joseon's domestic affairs ravaged by the war. Joseon required Tokugawa Ieyasu to send the Sovereign's message first before the peace overture between Joseon and Japan, that is, through "Seonwi ch'iseo" (先爲致書) as a precondition for sending envoys. Then, Ieyasu sent the Sovereign's Message to Joseon in the eleventh lunar month of 1606. Up to this point, in terms of the issue of the Sovereign's Message, existing research have focused mainly on the forgery theory of the Sovereign's Message, the modification theory of the Sovereign's Message, and the theory of the genuineness of the Sovereign's Message, because Ieyasu was only interested in the document format of the Sovereign's Message and an involvement in Tsushima without considering the situation of domestic politics. However, the Sovereign's Message issue was reviewed in the context of Joseon, Ming China, and Japan in East Asia. Joseon tried to recover its national discipline and security by quickly dealing with these postwar issues. Ming did not want to be involved in the peace negotiations between Joseon and Japan any further, and Japan needed to display domestically the succession and stabilization of the Edo Bakufu. As a result, Joseon accepted the Sovereign's Message sent by Ieyasu and sent the Reply and Prisoner Repatriation Envoy to Japan. As conditions were satisfied, there was a fear that Joseon could not rebuild the nation due to the Jurchen, the alienation of the public, and the distrust in royal authority, as Son Munwook actively persuaded. Further, Ming made a policy that Joseon should take care of its own situation with independent and active judgments without being involved in the negotiations between Joseon and Japan from May 1604. In that Joseon could independently respond to the peace negotiations with Japan without doubt, this opportunity had a positive effect on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Joseon and Japan. Ieyasu intended to establish national sovereignty through recovering the isolated relations in East Asian society through an invasion of Joseon and to attempt to normalize diplomatic relations between Joseon and Ming. In the early 1600s, Ieyasu was merely Hideyoshi's vassal, and his power was limited to the Kinai region (畿內) and the Kyoto area (京都), neither of which was a national area. In this situation, Joseon missions to Japan were an earnest need in order for the Bakufu to be recognized as holding the authority and the legitimacy of the government. Thus, he could not but actively respond to the request. Joseon's request for "Seonwi chi'seo" was not an unacceptable condition for Ieyasu. Also, he actively sent the Sovereign's Message to countries between 1604 and 1607 and promoted the shuinsen trade (朱印船). I do not think that Ieyasu left all matters to his associates in Tsushima and allowed them to produce the Sovereign's Message as a forged letter or as a modified letter before the recovery of diplomatic relations with Joseon. Because of the death of Yanagawa Shigenobu (柳川調信), who was fully responsible for the diplomatic relations with Joseon and the friendships between Son Munwook (孫文彧) and Genso (玄蘇), Tsushima had to cooperate with Ieyasu and its associates. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that the Sovereign's Message of Ieyasu sent in the eleventh lunar month of 1606 was forged or modified without his consent.