A Thought on North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine
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For Korean Peninsula watchers, the two most recent years have been tainted by further North Korean provocations. Three nuclear tests and a series of missile tests are signs that the North Korean nuclear crisis has reached a different level. While talks have focused on deterring the use of nuclear weapons or destroying incoming missiles using missile defense systems, relatively not much has been discussed about North Korea’s nuclear strategy and doctrine. To make extended deterrence against North Korea truly effective and fine-tune our counter–provocation strategy, we need to think about how North Korea would use its nuclear weapons before or during a war. One way to gain insight into its strategy is to examine its nuclear doctrine. Whatever the initial purpose the North Korean leadership had in mind, it has become clear that it is trying to build a second–strike capability, but whether its nuclear doctrine is based on an “assured retaliation” or “asymmetric escalation” strategy is to be watched carefully. North Korea’s reality indicates that an assured retaliation strategy is more likely. But as its nuclear capability develops, it could aim to adopt an asymmetric escalation strategy in the long-term. Before they accomplish that goal, the ROK–U.S. alliance should find an effective means of changing North Korea’s strategic thinking.
Abstract
For Korean Peninsula watchers, the two most recent years have been tainted by further North Korean provocations. Three nuclear tests and a series of missile tests are signs that the North Korean nuclear crisis has reached a different level. While talks have focused on deterring the use of nuclear weapons or destroying incoming missiles using missile defense systems, relatively not much has been discussed about North Korea’s nuclear strategy and doctrine. To make extended deterrence against North Korea truly effective and fine-tune our counter–provocation strategy, we need to think about how North Korea would use its nuclear weapons before or during a war. One way to gain insight into its strategy is to examine its nuclear doctrine. Whatever the initial purpose the North Korean leadership had in mind, it has become clear that it is trying to build a second–strike capability, but whether its nuclear doctrine is based on an “assured retaliation” or “asymmetric escalation” strategy is to be watched carefully. North Korea’s reality indicates that an assured retaliation strategy is more likely. But as its nuclear capability develops, it could aim to adopt an asymmetric escalation strategy in the long-term. Before they accomplish that goal, the ROK–U.S. alliance should find an effective means of changing North Korea’s strategic thinking.
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