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평화수역의 설치: 법적 쟁점, 영향과 대책

Establishment of Maritime Peace Zone: Legal Issues, Effects and Countermeasures

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"Inter-Korean Agreement on Military Matters" adopted in Pyongyang in September 2018 provides for "Maritime Peace Zone(hereafter abbreviated as MPZ)" around the Northern Limit Line(NLL) proclaimed by the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command in 1953. The western "Sea of Peace" is expected to promote relaxation of military tension and encourage exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North. To meet such expectation, MPZ should be established on the basis of recognition and respect of NLL. It is because NLL is not only de facto maritime demarcation line constituting an integral part of the Korean Armistice regime but also a factual line delimiting the two Korea's territorial jurisdictions, namely, a quasi-border territorial limit line. So the president and the military of the Republic of Korea(ROK) should protect and defend NLL in accordance with a duty to preserve territorial integrity stipulated in Article 66(2) of the the South Korean Constitution. Against this background, MPZ should be formed according to an "equal space criteria" in the south and north Korean sea across the NLL. On the other hand, if MPZ is established in the future, such territorial jurisdictions including the authority to stop, search or seizure ships, the authority to prevent any act violating the law, the authority to levy sanctions etc which ROK has exercised solely and exclusively in the south of NLL would be inevitably restricted to a considerable degree. So it is proper that "Inter-Korean Agreement on Military Matters" should get a prior consent of National Assembly to the ratification by the President. But President Moon Jae In's administration ignored constitutional procedures of parliamentarian consent to the presidential ratification of the instrument. This legal problem must be cured as soon as possible. In addition, the South Korean government should make efforts to minimize negative effects of MPZ and the Maritime Buffer Zone in Western Sea to be engendered in respect of national security.

Abstract

"Inter-Korean Agreement on Military Matters" adopted in Pyongyang in September 2018 provides for "Maritime Peace Zone(hereafter abbreviated as MPZ)" around the Northern Limit Line(NLL) proclaimed by the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command in 1953. The western "Sea of Peace" is expected to promote relaxation of military tension and encourage exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North. To meet such expectation, MPZ should be established on the basis of recognition and respect of NLL. It is because NLL is not only de facto maritime demarcation line constituting an integral part of the Korean Armistice regime but also a factual line delimiting the two Korea's territorial jurisdictions, namely, a quasi-border territorial limit line. So the president and the military of the Republic of Korea(ROK) should protect and defend NLL in accordance with a duty to preserve territorial integrity stipulated in Article 66(2) of the the South Korean Constitution. Against this background, MPZ should be formed according to an "equal space criteria" in the south and north Korean sea across the NLL. On the other hand, if MPZ is established in the future, such territorial jurisdictions including the authority to stop, search or seizure ships, the authority to prevent any act violating the law, the authority to levy sanctions etc which ROK has exercised solely and exclusively in the south of NLL would be inevitably restricted to a considerable degree. So it is proper that "Inter-Korean Agreement on Military Matters" should get a prior consent of National Assembly to the ratification by the President. But President Moon Jae In's administration ignored constitutional procedures of parliamentarian consent to the presidential ratification of the instrument. This legal problem must be cured as soon as possible. In addition, the South Korean government should make efforts to minimize negative effects of MPZ and the Maritime Buffer Zone in Western Sea to be engendered in respect of national security.

참고문헌 (30)

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