항공 유･무인 복합체계의 감항성 보안 강화: 통합 프로세스와 a-SAL을 중심으로

Abstract

Manned–unmanned teaming (MUM-T)–a core concept in future warfare–depends on network-centric operations and is thus highly exposed to cyberthreats. MUM-T can be applied across ground, aerial, and maritime domains; however, this study focuses specifically on the aviation domain. Current airworthiness certification frameworks primarily emphasize safety, thus revealing clear limitations in addressing security concerns. Hence, this study proposes an integrated security approach throughout the system development lifecycle and introduces the advanced security-assurance level (a-SAL), which is a threat-based assurance metric designed to enhance security in aviation MUM-T systems. To achieve this, the airworthiness security process defined in RTCA DO-326A is integrated into the domestic-weapon system-development process, thus enabling security to be embedded in the earliest design stages. Furthermore, the security-assurance level defined in DO-356A is enhanced by employing the MITRE ATT&CK framework, which enables the quantitative assessment of threat scenarios and the systematic derivation of assurance levels. Based on the MUM-T architecture (draft), we identified key threats to an unmanned aircraft platform and derived a-SALs at the S-A and S-B levels, thereby confirming specific security requirements. The significance of this study is the proposal of concrete alternatives to address cybersecurity threats that are not considered by existing safety-focused airworthiness certification systems. By converting these threats into practical standards through a quantitative threat assessment, this study establishes a foundation for simultaneously ensuring the safety and security of aviation MUM-T systems.