청중비용 억지위협의 타이밍과 신뢰성: 2017 한반도 위기 진단을 위한 경험 분석
The Timing of Audience Cost Deterrent Threat and Its Credibility: An Empirical Study for Evaluating the 2017 Korean Peninsula Crisis
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본 연구는 억지의 두 요소인 위협의 능력과 위협의 신뢰성이 차별적인 개념임을 규명하고, 능력이 과잉상태인 한반도에서 억지의 성패는 신뢰성에 달려있음을 주장한다. 또한 국내 정계·학계·언론계가 주도하는 담론이 능력 강화에만 편향되어 있음을 비판하면서 신뢰성 연구를 주도해온 공약학파, 이익학파, 청중비용학파를 소개하고 있다. 특히 청중비용학파가 두 학파의 한계를 극복했다고 평가하면서도 청중비용학파가 간과해온 타이밍이라는 변수에 주목하여 새로운 가설을 도출한다. 그리고 억지국·보호국·도전국으로 구성된 긴급확장억지위기 데이터를 통합·구축하여 가설검증을 시도한 결과 억지국 관련 부분은 지지되는 반면 보호국 및 도전국 관련 부분은 반증된다는 것이 규명되었다. 이러한 경험분석을 바탕으로 한 2017년 한반도 위기 진단은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 트럼프 행정부의 강경발언은 매우 신뢰할만한 억지위협이다. 둘째, 문재인 행정부의 한반도 운전자 구상 역시 억지효과를 갖고 있다. 셋째, 한미 간 이견은 의도하지 않은 조화다. 이러한 진단은 한국 사회 일각에서 제기되는 우려를 해소하는데 일조할 것으로 기대된다.
Abstract
Emphasizing that threat credibility is radically distinct from threat capability, this study argues that the success and failure of deterrence against North Korea depend upon threat credibility because the Korean peninsula has already been in a state of more than enough threat capability. Nevertheless, the measures to enhance threat credibility has been scarcely discussed in South Korea’s academia, political circles and the press. Therefore, this study introduces three major schools (commitment school, interest school and audience cost school) which have led studies on threat credibility. Especially, assessing that the audience cost theory has the most excellent explanatory power among them, this study suggests new hypotheses based upon the variable timing which the audience cost school has overlooked. The hypotheses are tested statistically against the immediate extended deterrence crisis dataset, which consists of the defender, the protégé, and the challenger. As a result, it is found that only the part of defender is supported strongly whereas the parts of the protégé and the challenger are falsified. Based on theses empirical findings, the 2017 Korean peninsular crisis is evaluated like the following. The first is that President Trump’s tough statements and military threats against North Korea should not be considered as bluffing. The second is that President Moon’s Korean Peninsula Driver Initiative can be effective in deterring North Korea. The third is that the different views between South Korea and the U.S. may be the unintended harmony. These conclusions are expected to play a part role in resolving concerns raised by the conservatives in South Korea.
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