Changing Nuclear Capabilities and Strategy between the United States and North Korea
1
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
Continuous development of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and the accompanying concern about the possible decoupling of the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States have produced numerous opinions on what should be done about North Korea’s nuclear program. While there are discussions on conceptual possibilities of deterrent or compellent use of nuclear weapons by North Korea, these discussions often fall short of making specific connections between the relational nuclear capabilities between North Korea and the United States, and their nuclear strategies. Such connection is necessary in grasping a clear picture of the nuclear security environment of the Korean Peninsula, and formulating possible policy responses the ROK should adopt as a result. This article seeks to make this connection by analyzing the nuclear capabilities and strategy of North Korea and the United States. It argues that North Korea will be able to pressure alliance decoupling only if it is able to field submarine–based ballistic missiles with an inter-continental range. The ROK should seek to avoid this outcome by strengthening its own deterrence measures against North Korea, seeking assurances on the U.S. alliance commitment, and seeking measures that could reverse North Korea’s potential second–strike capability.
Abstract
Continuous development of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and the accompanying concern about the possible decoupling of the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States have produced numerous opinions on what should be done about North Korea’s nuclear program. While there are discussions on conceptual possibilities of deterrent or compellent use of nuclear weapons by North Korea, these discussions often fall short of making specific connections between the relational nuclear capabilities between North Korea and the United States, and their nuclear strategies. Such connection is necessary in grasping a clear picture of the nuclear security environment of the Korean Peninsula, and formulating possible policy responses the ROK should adopt as a result. This article seeks to make this connection by analyzing the nuclear capabilities and strategy of North Korea and the United States. It argues that North Korea will be able to pressure alliance decoupling only if it is able to field submarine–based ballistic missiles with an inter-continental range. The ROK should seek to avoid this outcome by strengthening its own deterrence measures against North Korea, seeking assurances on the U.S. alliance commitment, and seeking measures that could reverse North Korea’s potential second–strike capability.
참고문헌 (29)
- "U.S. Intelligence: North Korea’s Sixth Test Was a 140 Kiloton ‘Advanced Nuclear’ Device" (2017)[URL]
- "5 Takeaways on North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Overflight of Japan" (2017)[URL]
- Dennis M. Drew, "Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems" (1988), Air University Press
- Keir A. Lieber, "The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence", International Security, 41(4), pp.9~49 (2017)
- Michael W. Doyle, "Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict" (2008), Princeton University Press
- Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", International Security, 18(4), pp.66~107 (1994)
- Vipin Narang, "Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers: North Korea and Iran", Washington Quarterly, 38(1), pp.73~91 (2015)
- Shane Smith, "North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy, North Korea’s Nuclear Futures Series" (2015), U.S.–Korea Institute at SAIS
- Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea’s Development of a Nuclear Weapons Strategy, North Korea’s Nuclear Future Series" (2015), U.S.–Korea Institute at SAIS
- Joel S. Wit, "North Korea’s Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy, North Korea’s Nuclear Futures Series" (2015), U.S.–Korea Institute at SAIS
- "Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project, Trident D-5"[URL]
- "Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project, Taepodong-2"[URL]
- "Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project, Hwasong-14"[URL]
- "U.S. Intelligence: North Korea’s ICBM Reentry Vehicles are Likely Good Enough to Hit the Continental U.S" (2017)[URL]
- "North Korea Overflies Japan with Another Intermediate–Range Ballistic Missile: Early Analysis" (2017)[URL]
- "Exclusive: U.S. Plans to Test THAAD Missile Defenses as North Korea Tensions Mount" (2017)[URL]
- "U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs" (2017)[URL]
- "A Nuclear North Korea"[URL]
- "Missiles of North Korea"[URL]
- "A New Submarine–Launched Ballistic Missile for North Korea" (2016)[URL]
- "KN-11" (2016)[URL]
- "What is True and Not True about North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM: A Technical Evaluation" (2017)[URL]
- "North Korea ‘Will Test Missiles Weekly,’ Senior Official Tells BBC" (2017)[URL]
- "Status of World Nuclear Forces"[URL]
- "New START"[URL]
- IISS, "The Military Balance 2016", pp.56~ (2016), Routledge
- "Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces" (2017)[URL]
- "Trump: ‘All Options are on the Table’ after North Korea Launched Missile over Japan" (2017)[URL]