아일랜드의 은행업규제와 그 시사점에 관한 연구

Abstract

Since the second half of 2007, so many countries have been difficulty in the financial crisis originated from the United States. In particular, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (hereinafter PIIGS) are the center of such a storm. Furthermore, Germany and France as leading countries in the European Union (hereinafter EU) invested in Ireland so much. In 2010, Ireland among the PIIGS triggered the European financial crisis as she came to an agreement for an 8,500,000,000 Euro bailout with the EU and International Monetary Fund (hereinafter IMF). Because of that, Germany and France may not withdraw their loan from her and the entire EU may be dangerous. This may aggravate the world economy again. In this sense, it is very important to find out what the problems are in the Irish banking regulations and what its lessons for Korea are. Because both Ireland and Korea are indirectly infected by the United States, it is also significant to examine the Irish banking regulations and its lessons for Korea. The author reviews the financial regulation focused on the banking regulation of Ireland and useful lessons for the Korean legal system as follows:(1) There are unconditional and unspecified prohibited banking businesses of Ireland far more than those of Korea. (2) The minimum capital for starting banking business in Korea is about four times more than that in Portugal and it needs to be reviewed. (3) There is a preliminary approval process for banking in Korea and such a process may be an overlapping regulation. Also, it needs to be reexamined. (4) There are different regulators between the approval and denial of banking business in Ireland while there is the same regulator to approve and deny the banking business in Korea. (5) The Irish banking regulator’s staffs will be exempted from their responsibility due to their negligence while the Korean banking regulator’s staffs will not be discharged. (6) - (7) The bank’s investment limits and limits of holding bank’s shares are applied without discrimination in Ireland, regardless of who the receivers and shareholders are. However, because a bank will be affected by its receivers or shareholders, the Irish approach is not efficient as compared to the Korean approach that there is different investment limits and limits of holding bank’s shares depending on receivers and shareholders. Instead, because there may be regulatory and supervisory arbitrage in the Korean regulation, such Korean different limits need to be reviewed again. (8) The internal control mechanism is introduced into the Irish banking system without the compliance officer while the compliance officer is also introduced into the Korean banking system. (9) The appointment of members of management board in bank needs to be approved in advance by the Irish banking regulator. On the other hands, there does not need to be preapproved from the Korean banking regulator. (10) The function of a CEO is separated from that of the chairperson of the board of directors in a bank in Ireland while it is not in Korea. (11) There is a prompt corrective action in Korea, not Ireland. However, the suspension of such an action needs to be reexamined to improve the quickness of the action. (12) Even though the Irish on-site inspection applies to only a bank not its significant shareholders, the Korean on-site inspection applies to not only a bank but also its large shareholders. Because there are several regulations over banks’ large shareholders, the on-site inspection for banks’ large shareholders must be an excessive regulation. It needs to be reexamined. (13) There are many provisions for specified cooperation both other domestic and overseas regulators. However, there are just two provisions for the cooperation that are not specified. Because the Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter FTA) is being implemented, specified provisions for cooperation must be immediately supplemented. (14) The independent state-run agency for the protection of financial consumer is running in Ireland, not Korea. In general, because many financial instruments are so complicated, the protection for financial consumers needs to be strengthened far more than ever. Even though there is currently a debate on the establishment of the state agency dedicated to the protection of financial consumers in Korea, there is still a question of how the independence of the becoming state-run agency for financial consumers is guaranteed.