스페인의 은행업규제와 그 시사점에 관한 연구

Abstract

Many countries cross the world have had severe difficulty in financial crisis originated from the United States since 2007. The European Union (hereinafter EU) that is another pillar of the world economy has been also infected with such crisis. In particular, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (hereinafter PIIGS) is at the core of this turbulence in EU. The PIIGS has a major drawback that runs State fiscal deficits. Moreover, the PIIGS has been aggravated by the PIIGS’ poor financial regulations. This means that prudent financial regulations can lessen such deficits and reduce the financial crisis of the PIIGS. The piece examines Spain among the PIIGS and concludes as follows: (1) Specialized banks cannot take deposits from the public in Spain, but they can do in Korea. (2) There is not any express provision of the supervisory and regulatory principle in Korea and Spain. However, such an express provision needs to be provided in the legislations for the legal stability. (3) The minimum capital for banking in Korea is about four times more than that in Spain. (4) In Spain, the Minister of Economy and Finance (hereinafter MEF) decides whether the banking is authorized or not, but another regulations excluding the licensing for banking are excised by another financial regulator, the Bank of Spain (hereinafter BS). On the other hand, one financial regulator, Financial Services Commission (hereinafter FSC) excises all sorts of financial regulations in Korea. (5) There is a preliminary approval process in Korea, but not in Spain. (6) – (7) There are discriminated investment limits and limits of holding bank’s shares based on receivers and shareholders in Korea, but not in Spain. (8) An internal control mechanism is provided in both countries, but the compliance officer is introduced to Korea, not Spain. (9) A prompt corrective action is adopted by Korea, not Spain. (10) Even though an on-site inspection is provided in Korea and Spain, its expansion into other subjects including banks needs to be examined. (11) There are many detailed provisions for the cooperation of the supervisory and regulatory approach in Spain, but not in Korea. (12) While any start-up banking company cannot pay dividends to its shareholders without the BS’s permission for three years, there is any regulation in Korea. (13) Any start-up banking company cannot give credit to its directors for five years in Spain, not in Korea. (14) The BS may send interim directors to so extremely troubled banks in Spain, not Korea. On the other hand, the Korean banking authority can just recommend that the general meeting of any bank dismiss its director from his or her directorship.