고려 말의 군사화와 지방 병력 동원 방식

Abstract

After the mid-14th century, Goryeo faced a national crisis due to frequent invasions by Japanese pirates (Wakou ) and the Red Turbans. In response, the political, social, and economic systems were reorganized to serve military objectives, and a wartime total mobilization system was established, deploying as many people and resources as possible to the front lines. However, by the time King Gongmin ascended the throne, the existing central military system had effectively collapsed, making it impossible for the central army alone to respond to threats across the country. Establishing local defensive bases or garrison troops was also difficult, so each region had to rely on ad hoc measures. This raises the question: what human resources did localities mobilize for defense? Numerous cases show that local officials took the lead in mobilizing troops on site. The primary targets for mobilization were former officials, followed by local elites, and even lower-class individuals skilled in horsemanship. Meanwhile, generals dispatched from the capital did not command large armies but rather led small elite units and directed locally mobilized forces. They organized troops according to local circumstances and, during battle, deployed their own followers (such as retainers or personal aides) alongside local recruits. In border regions such as the northeastern and northwestern frontiers, the government established Manho-bu (Myriarchate) to institutionalize the private military power of local strongmen. When these local elites organized military forces, the king granted them official titles such as Manho (Myriarchy) and bestowed supplementary ranks or blank appointment certificates to their followers, delegating both mobilization and reward authority. Commanders maintained private groups of followers, who formed the core of troop mobilization. When these groups distinguished themselves in battle, both the leader and his followers could receive official posts. In summary, local troop mobilization in late Goryeo was not the result of a centrally coordinated plan, but rather was carried out flexibly under the leadership of local elites and officials. Generals dispatched from the capital or local strongmen were granted full authority over mobilization, leadership, and rewards, and they organized and mobilized human and material resources based on their pre-existing networks of followers. The issues of private landholdings and private armies, often cited as major social problems in late Goryeo, emerged from this context. This structure persisted until the transition to a centralized military system after the founding of Joseon, and it led to the “universal conscription of commoners” principle in early Joseon. The militarization of late Goryeo was thus a transitional phenomenon in which wartime mobilization and private military networks coexisted, laying the foundation for the military system of early Joseon.