Signaling Valence by Positive and Negative Campaigns
1
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper aims at analyzing both positive and negative political campaigns which affect voters’ perception about candidate valence. Consider the situation where candidates know valences each other but the voters cannot observe one candidate’s valence. We characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria, which depend on the cost of positive campaign for the candidate and the cost of negative campaign against the opponent. The cost may be interpreted as the campaign budget constraint or the risk from backfire. We show that there always exist a pooling equilibrium and, for a wide range of parameters, a separating equilibrium. If positive campaign costs sufficiently less by the candidate with higher valence, the high valence candidate conducts positive campaign whereas the low valence candidate does not. More important, if negative campaign against the high valence opponent is sufficiently costly or risky due to backfire, the incumbent conducts negative campaign against a low valence challenger but not against a high valence one. We also show that, the smaller the valence difference is between two candidates, the larger the platform divergence becomes on the equilibrium.
Abstract
This paper aims at analyzing both positive and negative political campaigns which affect voters’ perception about candidate valence. Consider the situation where candidates know valences each other but the voters cannot observe one candidate’s valence. We characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria, which depend on the cost of positive campaign for the candidate and the cost of negative campaign against the opponent. The cost may be interpreted as the campaign budget constraint or the risk from backfire. We show that there always exist a pooling equilibrium and, for a wide range of parameters, a separating equilibrium. If positive campaign costs sufficiently less by the candidate with higher valence, the high valence candidate conducts positive campaign whereas the low valence candidate does not. More important, if negative campaign against the high valence opponent is sufficiently costly or risky due to backfire, the incumbent conducts negative campaign against a low valence challenger but not against a high valence one. We also show that, the smaller the valence difference is between two candidates, the larger the platform divergence becomes on the equilibrium.
참고문헌 (28)
- Ansolabehere, S, "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models", Public Choice, 103(3-4), pp.327~336 (2000)
- Aragones, E, "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate", Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1), pp.131~161 (2002)
- Ashworth, S., "Campaign Finance and Voter with Entrenched Incumbents", American Political Science Review, 100, pp.55~68 (2006)
- Banks, J. S., "A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information", Journal of Economic Theory, 50, pp.309~325 (1990)
- Bernhardt, M.D, "Candidate Reputations and the ‘Incumbency Effect’", Journal of Public Economics, 27, pp.47~67 (1985)
- Blackwell, M., "A Framework for Dynamic Causal Inference in Political Science", American Journal of Political Science, 57(2), pp.504~520 (2013)
- Callander, S, "Lies, Damned Lies, and Political Campaigns", Games and Economic Behavior, 60, pp.262~286 (2007)
- Calvert, R., "Robustness of the Multi-dimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence", American Journal of Political Science, 29(1), pp.69~95 (1985)
- Caplan, B., "The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies" (2007), Princeton University Press
- Coate, S., "Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy", American Economic Review, 94, pp.628~655 (2004)
- Coleman, J.J, "Congressional Campaign Spending and the Quality of Democracy", Journal of Politics, 62(3), pp.757~789 (2000)
- Damore, D. F., "Candidate Strategy and the Decision to Go Negative", Political Research Quarterly, 55(3), pp.669~686 (2002)
- Gersbach, H., "Communication Skills and Competition for Donors", European Journal of Political Economy, 14(1), pp.3~18 (1998)
- Groseclose, T., "A Model of Candidate Location when One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage", American Journal of Political Science, 45(4), pp.862~886 (2001)
- Harrington Jr. J.E, "The Impact of Re-election Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises", Games and Economic Behavior, 5, pp.71~97 (1993)
- Harrington Jr. J.E, "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections", American Economic Review, 83, pp.27~42 (1993)
- Harrington Jr. J.E, "A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning", Games and Economic Behavior, 17, pp.209~229 (1996)
- Iversen, T, "Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing Capitalism through a Turbulent Century" (2019), Princeton University Press
- Kartik, N, "Signaling Character in Electoral Competition", American Economic Review, 97(3), pp.852~870 (2007)
- Londregan, J, "Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation", pp.355~377 (1993), Cambridge University Press
- Lovett, M.J, "The Seeds of Negativity: Knowledge and Money", Marketing Science, 30(3), pp.430~446 (2011)
- Prat, A., "Campaign Advertising and VoterWelfare", Review of Economic Studies, 69, pp.999~1017 (2002)
- Prat, A., "Oxford Handbook of Political Economy", pp.50~63 (2006), Oxford University Press
- Sigelman, L, "You Take the High Road and I’ll Take the Low Road? The Interplay of Attack Strategies and Tactics in Presidential Campaigns", Journal of Politics, 65(2), pp.518~531 (2003)
- Skaperdas, S, "Modeling Negative Campaigning", American Political Science Review, 89, pp.49~61 (1995)
- Stokes, D., "Spatial Models of Party Competition", American Political Science Review, 57, pp.368~377 (1963)
- Stokes, D., "Electoral Politics", pp.141~164 (1992), Clarendon Press
- Wittman, D. A., "Candidates with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model", Journal of Economic Theory, 14(1), pp.180~189 (1977)