Valence Characteristics and Split-Ticket Voting of Partisan Voters
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We analyze the voting behavior of partisan voters in a two-party presidential system when voters care about candidates’ valence characteristics as well as policy issues. We show that since the president has a larger influence over policy than a single representative, partisan voters are more likely to vote for their own party’s candidate in the presidential election than in the legislative election. We also show that partisan voters are more likely to vote for their own party’s candidate in legislative elections when the incumbent president is from the opponent party than when he is from their own party. We provide some evidence that supports these findings.
Abstract
We analyze the voting behavior of partisan voters in a two-party presidential system when voters care about candidates’ valence characteristics as well as policy issues. We show that since the president has a larger influence over policy than a single representative, partisan voters are more likely to vote for their own party’s candidate in the presidential election than in the legislative election. We also show that partisan voters are more likely to vote for their own party’s candidate in legislative elections when the incumbent president is from the opponent party than when he is from their own party. We provide some evidence that supports these findings.
참고문헌 (17)
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