사회적 선호와 최적 조세 메커니즘
Social Preferences and Optimal Income Taxation
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정보의 비대칭성이 존재하는 역선택 모형에서, 가처분소득에 대한 시기심이 존재하는 경우 생산성이 높은 납세자는 최선의 노력수준보다 높은 노력을, 생산성이 낮은 납세자는 표준적 조세에서의 노력수준보다 낮은 노력수준을 달성한다. 따라서, 표준적 최적조세의 최적해에 관한 형평성과 생산 효율성의 트레이드 오프 문제가 (i) ‘총 세액 관점’에서 더욱 심화 될 경우, (ⅱ) ‘한계세액 관점’에서 그러한 트레이드 오프관계가 역전되는 경우, (ⅲ) 한계세액과 총 세액 관점에서의 상이한 사회적 비용의 변동이 발생한다. 그 결과, 총 세액의 관점에서 형평성보다도 효율성을 중시한다면 납세자 간에 렌트를 비교하게 하는 정책이 유효하며, 한계세율의 관점에서 생산성이 낮은 납세자에게 보다 심각한 역진성 효과가 나타난다.
Abstract
To examine the properties of the optimal income taxation scheme under adverse selection, we analyzed taxpaying agents who are averse to inequity. The efficient agent who is averse to inequity was found to produce more outputs than first-best level, while the inefficient agent produces less than the second-best level of standard adverse selection output when the agents compared incomes among themselves. Thus, the tradeoff between efficiency and equity becomes more serious or positive than the tradeoff without inequity aversion if agents compare income. When agents compare rents, the optimal productions become identical to the standard adverse selection which has the same degree of tradeoff between efficiency and equity.
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