On the Problem of Virtue in Confucian and Neoconfucian Philosophy

Abstract

The concept of virtue seems to be one of the rare cases where the European and the Chinese traditions coincide. The meaning of the Latin word virtusandofGreekaretéseemstobesimilartotheChinesedé德. Most striking in virtue is that it is a capacity for self‑realisation through action which is unique to man. On the other hand, there is something physical about it. It is the strength to do something. This strength overcomes the resistance of what is naturally given, it transforms the world, turns the natural world into a human one. In the Chinese tradition, dé 德, i.e. virtue, is therefore always connected with daò 道, the totality of natural forces. In the Chinese tradition, as opposed to the European one, virtue is itself considered to be a natural force that is present in man. This force sustains man's connectedness, unity and harmony with the surrounding world. Things exist through the unity of principle理 and ether氣. But the knowledge of this unity is due to principle. Moral and legal norms are shifted totally to the sphere of principle. Therefore their have found the final dissolution from a heroic models. Above all the classical Confucians, but also the other schools, would reply to this that there is nothing more precise than a concrete successful action. Its result fits the world perfectly. The difference is due to the differing interest of ethical thought. In the case of the Confucians the path is more direct. The actor establishes a precise pattern for other actions. Education therefore lies in detailed knowledge about forms of behaviour, not so much in conceptual differentiation. It is quite possible that generalisation may be a methodical prerequisite for success in this endeavour. That problem, too, is discussed. But the success of conceptualisation lies in the successful performance of individual actions, not in shaping actions in accordance with normative concepts.