R&D Spillovers with Endogenous Absorptive Capacity: Lessons for Developing Countries
2
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper analyzes the role of absorptive capacity in R&D spillovers through strategic R&D investments in a game-theoretic framework. In the model, a firm’s effective R&D is composed of idiosyncratic R&D, which produces its own innovations, and identical R&D, which improves absorptive capacity. The model shows that in the presence of absorptive capacity firms have a tendency to underinvest (overinvest) in idiosyncratic (identical) R&D relative to the social optimum. As the spillover becomes larger, firms decrease their own R&D while they become more inclined towards strategic exploitation of rivals’ efforts. Since the former effect overpowers the latter, the total amount of R&D decreases as the spillover increases. This is socially undesirable, providing a potential justification for a governmental subsidy for idiosyncratic R&D and a tax on identical R&D. The findings may have important implications for newly industrialized or emerging countries that consider a redirection of national R&D policy and intellectual property rights (IPR) regime.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of absorptive capacity in R&D spillovers through strategic R&D investments in a game-theoretic framework. In the model, a firm’s effective R&D is composed of idiosyncratic R&D, which produces its own innovations, and identical R&D, which improves absorptive capacity. The model shows that in the presence of absorptive capacity firms have a tendency to underinvest (overinvest) in idiosyncratic (identical) R&D relative to the social optimum. As the spillover becomes larger, firms decrease their own R&D while they become more inclined towards strategic exploitation of rivals’ efforts. Since the former effect overpowers the latter, the total amount of R&D decreases as the spillover increases. This is socially undesirable, providing a potential justification for a governmental subsidy for idiosyncratic R&D and a tax on identical R&D. The findings may have important implications for newly industrialized or emerging countries that consider a redirection of national R&D policy and intellectual property rights (IPR) regime.
참고문헌 (28)
- Amir, R, "Modelling Imperfectly Appropriable R&D via Spillovers", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(7), pp.1013~1032 (2000)
- Amir, R., "Noncooperative versus Cooperative R&D with Endogenous Spillovers Rates", Games and Economic Behavior, 42(2), pp.183~207 (2003)
- Arrow, K. J., "The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors" (1962), Princeton University Press
- Brander, J. A., "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry", Journal of International Economics, 18(1-2), pp.83~100 (1985)
- Cassimann, B., "Endogenizing Know-How Flows through the Nature of R&D Investments", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(6), pp.775~799 (2002)
- Cohen, W. M., "Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D", Economic Journal, 99(397), pp.569~596 (1989)
- Cohen, W. M, "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation", Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), pp.128~152 (1990)
- d’Aspremont, C., "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers", American Economic Review, 78(5), pp.1133~1137 (1988)
- De Bondt, R, "Spillovers and Innovative Activities", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15(1), pp.1~28 (1996)
- Grünfeld, L, "Meet Me Halfway but Don’t Rush: Absorptive Capacity and Strategic R&D Investment Revisited", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(8), pp.1091~1109 (2003)
- Hamberg, D, "Invention in the Industrial Research Laboratory", Journal of Political Economy, 71(2), pp.95~115 (1963)
- Hammerschmidt, A, "No Pain, No Gain: An R&D Model with Endogenous Absorptive Capacity", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 165(3), pp.418~437 (2009)
- Henriques I, "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Comment", American Economic Review, 80(3), pp.638~640 (1990)
- Kaiser, U, "R&D with Spillovers and Endogenous Absorptive Capacity", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 158(2), pp.286~303 (2002)
- Kaiser, U., "An Empirical Test of Models Explaining Research Expenditures and Research Cooperation: Evidence for the German Service Sector", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(6), pp.747~774 (2002)
- Kamien, M. I., "Meet Me Halfway: Research Joint Ventures and Absorptive Capacity", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(7), pp.995~1012 (2000)
- Kang, M, "Trade Policy Mix: IPR Protection and R&D Subsidies", Canadian Journal of Economics, 39(3), pp.744~757 (2006)
- Leahy, D., "R&D Spillovers and the Case for Industrial Policy in an Open Economy", Oxford Economic Papers, 51(1), pp.40~59 (1999)
- Pei-Cheng Liao, "International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes", International Economic Journal, 21(3), pp.399~417 (2007), 한국국제경제학회
- Mansfield, E, "How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out?", Journal of Industrial Economics, 34(2), pp.217~223 (1985)
- Martin, S., "Advanced Industrial Economics" (2002), Blackwell
- Müller, W. F., "The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors" (1962), Princeton University Press
- Nelson, R, "The Simple Economics of Basic Research", Journal of Political Economy, 67(3), pp.297~306 (1959)
- Poyago-Theotoky, J, "A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R&D Duopoly", Review of Industrial Organization, 15(3), pp.253~262 (1999)
- Qui, L. D., "Policy on International R&D Cooperation: Subsidy or Tax?", European Economic Review, 42(9), pp.1727~1750 (1998)
- Spencer, B. J., "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy", Review of Economic Studies, 50(4), pp.707~722 (1983)
- Suzumura, K, "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Oligopoly with Spillovers", American Economic Review, 82(5), pp.1307~1320 (1992)
- Wiethaus, L, "Absorptive Capacity and Connectedness: Why Competing Firms Also Adopt Identical R&D Approaches", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(5-6), pp.467~481 (2005)