Did Anti-dumping Duties Really Restrict Import?: Empirical Evidence from the US, the EU, China, and India
2
조회
0
다운로드
1
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper studied the effects of anti-dumping measures on the imports to investigate whether the trade restriction effect of an anti-dumping duty is dominant. Our results indicate that a 1% increase in the anti-dumping duties decreases the import of the targeted product by about 0.43~0.51%. The actual statistics, however, show that the total import of the targeted products increased by about 30 percent while an anti-dumping duty was in force. That indicates that an anti-dumping duty is just a temporary import relief. This paper also investigated whether an anti-dumping duty is terminated in the case that the injury would not be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed. The hazards model estimates show that increase in market share, MFN tariff rate, and dumping margin decrease the hazard of termination of an anti-dumping duty, but the increase in value added increases the hazard of termination. Generally speaking, this result indicates that the WTO member countries have regulated the overuse of an anti-dumping measure. The findings of this paper show that there is a country- and industry-wise heterogeneous characteristic in the effect as well as termination of an anti-dumping duty.
Abstract
This paper studied the effects of anti-dumping measures on the imports to investigate whether the trade restriction effect of an anti-dumping duty is dominant. Our results indicate that a 1% increase in the anti-dumping duties decreases the import of the targeted product by about 0.43~0.51%. The actual statistics, however, show that the total import of the targeted products increased by about 30 percent while an anti-dumping duty was in force. That indicates that an anti-dumping duty is just a temporary import relief. This paper also investigated whether an anti-dumping duty is terminated in the case that the injury would not be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed. The hazards model estimates show that increase in market share, MFN tariff rate, and dumping margin decrease the hazard of termination of an anti-dumping duty, but the increase in value added increases the hazard of termination. Generally speaking, this result indicates that the WTO member countries have regulated the overuse of an anti-dumping measure. The findings of this paper show that there is a country- and industry-wise heterogeneous characteristic in the effect as well as termination of an anti-dumping duty.
참고문헌 (24)
- Baier, S. L., "Bonus vetus OLS: A Simple Method for Approximating International Trade-cost Effects Using the Gravity Equation", Journal of International Economics, 77(1), pp.77~85 (2009)
- Baier, S. L., "Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence", Review of International Economics, 22(1), pp.31~58 (2014)
- Granting Market Economy Status to China in the EU: An Economic Impact Assessment, "Bellora, C.", Research and Expertise on the World Economy, ~, pp.Policy Brief, no. 11 (2016)
- Antidumping and the Death of Trade, "Besedes, T.", NBER, ~, pp.NBER Working Paper, no. 19555 (2013)
- Besedes, T, "The Hazardous Effects of Antidumping", Economic Inquiry, 55(1), pp.9~30 (2016)
- Blonigen, B. A, "Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Antidumping Activity", Canadian Journal of Economics, 39(3), pp.874~900 (2006)
- "Global Antidumping Database" (2016)[URL]
- Antidumping and Market Competition: Implications for Emerging Economies, "Bown, C. P.", World Bank Policy Research, ~, pp.World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 6197 (2012)
- Current Status of Anti-Dumping Investigations: The Korean Perspective, "Choi, N", KIEP, ~, pp.KIEP Opinions, no. 99 (2016)
- Economic Costs of Protectionism and Its Policy Implication, "Choi, N.", Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 11~15 (2011)
- Helpman, E., "Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Patterns and Trading Volumes", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1), pp.441~488 (2008)
- Jochmans, K., "Two-way Models for Gravity", Paper Presented at the International Panel Data Conference (2015), Central European University
- Konings, J., "Antidumping Protection Hurts Exporters: Firm-level Evidence", Review of World Economics, 149(2), pp.295~320 (2013)
- "Korea Trade Commission (KTC)"[URL]
- 이홍구, "Estimating the Protection Effects of Antidumping Dutiesa", Journal of Korea Trade, 13(3), pp.1~23 (2009), 한국무역학회
- Novy, D, "Gravity Redux: Measuring International Trade Costs with Panel Data", Economic Inquiry, 51(1), pp.101~121 (2013)
- Park, S, "The Trade Depressing and Trade Diversion Effects of Antidumping Actions: The Case of China", China Economic Review, 20(3), pp.542~548 (2009)
- The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions, "Prusa, T", NBER, ~, pp.Working Paper, no. 5440 (1996)
- Santos Silva, J. M. C., "Trading Partners and Trading Volumes: Implementing the Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein Model Empirically", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 77(1), pp.93~105 (2015)
- "Survival Analysis Using Cox Proportional Hazards Modeling for Single and Multiple Event Time Data" (2003)[URL]
- Timmer, M. P., "An Illustrated User Guide to the World Input-Output Database: The Case of Global Automotive Production", Review of International Economics, 23(3), pp.575~605 (2015)
- Vandenbussche, H., "The Chilling Trade Effects of Antidumping Proliferation", European Economic Review, 54(6), pp.760~777 (2010)
- "World Trade Organization (WTO)" (2016)[URL]
- "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994" (2016)[URL]