한국전쟁기 유엔군의 피난민 인식과 정책

Abstract

In official war history of Korean War, refuge is utmost important topic to be discussed. However, unfortunately, researchers have tended to only describe a situation of refuge-refugee's suffering and misery-very rough stage and not wholly understandable. Even more, refuge has been toyed, captured within the Anti-Communist mythic rhetoric, as a sort of quest for freedom, like ‘exodus’ from horrible Communism in North Korea, as an evidence justifying an orthodoxy of ‘Republic of Korea’ and Liberalism and revealing an monstrous invasion from Communism. The purpose of this thesis is to expose characters of Korean War and re-understand ‘relation between nation and people’ through focusing on refuge. For this direction, this thesis are centered on various experience undergone by refugees in the time of UN army's refugee cognition and polices. Just after an outbreak of Korean War, Rheesyngman government thrown by its people and thereafter, people left behind could not help being refugees. Even if the refugees were people of their nation, they were threatened to prove whether they were ‘rebellious element’ or not constantly. If they could prove themselves innocent ideologically and sanitarily in this harsh surveillance and control, they barely became an object to aid. On the other hand, if they could not, no one guarantee their safety. According to Rheesyngman government's expression for them, they left as ‘sacrifice for vitory’. Unfortunately, UN army's attitude on them was not so different. UN army defined refugees as an outcast from their own hometown so that they differentiate the native residents in local area and the refugees. Therefore, we cannot identify refugee with other simple concepts; ‘war victim’ or ‘residual needy’. Refugees, since they were not the native, were enforced to prove their identity and exposed to strict controls and surveillance. Also, there was a ‘lethal force’ to refugees who did not follow the ‘movement restriction phere ’ and disturbed UN's military strategies. Even, the army did not avoid to strafe and bombard indiscriminately towards them. Moreoem. Mone of US division commander regarded refugee as ‘fair game’. In this context Mobserving the humanitarian guideline was surely easycriminaignored in clash with military vantnes and demands. The reason why the humanitarian relief program could hadvantnekept was that the program matvisd or, at least, went along to military purpose. This ‘purpose’ may based on the commands from UNC. To see this circumstance, we should cognize the severe damage and victim of refugees as ‘methodical destruction’, not as ‘collateral damage’ argued by UN army.