The Effect of Target Ownership Structure in the Wealth Gains in Owner-Manager Dominant Acquisitions: Evidence from Korean Cases
0
조회
0
다운로드
5
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper examines how the distribution of target ownership is related to the wealth gains of target shareholders in “owner-manager” dominant acquisitions, in which a firm is managed by managers and directors nominated and closely directed by controlling shareholders. Using the Korean case of mergers and acquisitions during 1996-2007, we find that the agency problem exists between owner-managers and non-controlling shareholders. This finding is different from what we can observe in the US case, where the agency conflict between managers and shareholders is more crucial. In the meantime, the effect of the bidder’s top 30 chaebol membership on the wealth of target shareholders is inconclusive. In order to resolve the agency problem, the presence of institutional shareholding may be effective.
Abstract
This paper examines how the distribution of target ownership is related to the wealth gains of target shareholders in “owner-manager” dominant acquisitions, in which a firm is managed by managers and directors nominated and closely directed by controlling shareholders. Using the Korean case of mergers and acquisitions during 1996-2007, we find that the agency problem exists between owner-managers and non-controlling shareholders. This finding is different from what we can observe in the US case, where the agency conflict between managers and shareholders is more crucial. In the meantime, the effect of the bidder’s top 30 chaebol membership on the wealth of target shareholders is inconclusive. In order to resolve the agency problem, the presence of institutional shareholding may be effective.
참고문헌 (21)
- Bae, Kee-Hong, "Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups", The Journal of Finance, 57(6), pp.2695~2740 (2002)
- Brown, Stephen J, "Using Daily Stock Returns, the Case of Event Studies", Journal of Financial Economics, 통권 : 14, pp.3~31 (1985)
- 조지호, "기업지배구조가 인수합병의 성과에 미치는 영향", 재무관리연구, 21(2), pp.1~25 (2004), 한국재무관리학회
- Seong-Ho Cho, "Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions under Turbulent and Liquidity-Scarce Environment: Learning from Korean Cases", Seoul Journal of Business, 13(2), pp.35~58 (2007), 경영대학부속경영연구소
- Choudbury, Bhagwan, "Pre-tender Offer Share Acquisition Strategy in Takeovers", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29(1), pp.117~129 (1994)
- Grossman S. J, "Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids", The Journal of Finance, 35(2), pp.323~334 (1980)
- Hirshleifer, David, "Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids", The Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp.295~324 (1990)
- Jensen, Micheal C, "The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence", Journal of Financial Economics, 통권 : 11, pp.5~50 (1983)
- Johnson, Simon, "Tunneling", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 90, pp.22~27 (2000)
- Khanna, Tarun, "Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets: An analysis of diversified Indian business groups", Journal of Finance, 통권 : 55, pp.867~891 (2000)
- La Porta, Rafael, "Corporate Ownership around the World", The Journal of Finance, 54(2), pp.471~517 (1999)
- Moeller,Thomas, "Let’s make a deal! How shareholder control impacts merger", Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp.167~190 (2005)
- Pound,John, "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight", Journal of Financial Economics, 통권 : 20, pp.237~265 (1988)
- A. J. Auerbach, "Mergers and Acquisitions" (1988), Chicago University Press
- Salter, Malcolm S, "Diversification Through Acquisition: Strategies for Creating Economic Value" (1979), The Free Press
- Seth, Anju, "Value Creation in Acquisitions: A Re-examination of Performance Issues", Strategic Management Journal, 통권 : 11, pp.99~115 (1990)
- Shleifer, Andrei, "“Large Shareholders and Corporate Control", , The Journal of Political Economy,, 94(3) (1986)
- Slusky, Alexander R, "Synergy, Agency, and the Determinants of Premia Paid in Mergers", Journal of Industrial Economics, 39(3), pp.277~296 (1991)
- Song, Moon H, "The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth", The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28(4), pp.439~457 (1993)
- Stulz, René M., "The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers", The Journal of Finance,, 45(3), pp.817~833 (1990)
- Sudarsanam, Sudi, "Shareholder Wealth Gains in Mergers: Effect of Synergy and Ownership Structure", Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,, 통권 : 23, pp.673~698 (1996)