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Left-Wing Veto Players and Agenda Setters: Economic Reform in Developing Democracies of Latin America

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Why do some states implement economic liberalization policies whileothers fail to do so? In this paper, I show that the number and ideologicalpositions of the veto players and their interactions with each otherexplain differences in economic reform efforts and outcomes. Usingseveral indicators of the veto players and their partisanship, I conductempirical tests of the effects of the number of veto players and theirideological policy preferences on budget balances, as an indicator ofreform effort, using panel data analysis of developing democracies from1978 to 2000. Also, I test the veto players partisanship against anindicator of reform effort outcomes for Latin American countries. I findthat the left-wing partisans hinder economic reform efforts while theright-wing veto players, which usually include the agenda setter in thesesamples, promote economic reform efforts.

Abstract

Why do some states implement economic liberalization policies whileothers fail to do so? In this paper, I show that the number and ideologicalpositions of the veto players and their interactions with each otherexplain differences in economic reform efforts and outcomes. Usingseveral indicators of the veto players and their partisanship, I conductempirical tests of the effects of the number of veto players and theirideological policy preferences on budget balances, as an indicator ofreform effort, using panel data analysis of developing democracies from1978 to 2000. Also, I test the veto players partisanship against anindicator of reform effort outcomes for Latin American countries. I findthat the left-wing partisans hinder economic reform efforts while theright-wing veto players, which usually include the agenda setter in thesesamples, promote economic reform efforts.

참고문헌 (76)

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