Diagnosis of and Prospects for the Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula: Lessons from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022

Abstract

There are two ways to analyze the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022: through the lens of long-lasting and complex bilateral relations between Moscow and Kyiv and through that of great power politics over the 30 years since the collapse of the Iron Curtain. Exploring the implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the Korean Peninsula is crucial, especially from the perspective of how small (weak) states respond to great power politics. First, we must pay attention to NATO’s behavior before the invasion. Second, after Russia invaded Ukraine, Sweden and Finland submitted applications to join NATO, a stunning event. Both countries share borders with Russia, and Sweden and Finland adopted military neutrality from 1814 and 1948, respectively. Both countries abandoned neutrality and decided to join NATO after Russia’s invasion. Finland’s policy shift has significant implications for the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. Finland gained independence from Russia in 1917, but was attacked by the Soviet Union in November 1939 and was a Soviet colony until 1945. Yet even after regaining independence its sovereignty was truncated. ‘Finlandization’ refers to a country that nominally takes a neutral position but whose sovereignty is undermined by great powers. On May 17, 2022, Finland’s Congress approved the government’s decision to join NATO, ditching decades of neutrality. The security environment on the Korean Peninsula arises from the complex relationship between the two Koreas and four countries. Despite its complexity, a key factor is the rise of China. China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula is summarized as maintaining the divided status quo. Specifically, the Korean Peninsula's security environment is determined by the ‘strategic value’ recognized by the United States and China. In the end, China’s policy on the Korean Peninsula aims for ‘externalization’ in the case of North Korea and ‘Finlandization’ in the case of South Korea. In the 21st century, the fate of the Korean Peninsula should not be decided by bargaining and confrontation between great powers. Based on the robust South Korea-US alliance, we should aim to minimize conflicts with neighboring countries and maximize national interests. Unfortunately, a single alternative strategy that can satisfy all stakeholders around the Korean Peninsula is not feasible. Furthermore, South Korea-China relations should be rooted in mutual respect. We need to make it clear that the conventional hierarchical understanding between Beijing and Seoul is outdated. It is necessary to set up a horizontal relationship between the two.