베이즈주의에서의 증거개념
"Bayesian Concept of Evidence"
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오래된 증거의 문제는 가설이 제안되기 이전에 이미 알려진 증거는 그 가설을 입증할 수 없다는 문제를 제기한다. 오래된 증거의 문제는 베이즈적 입증 개념에 심각한 문제를 제기하는데 그것은 관련 학자들의 많은 노력에도 불구하고 여전히 미해결의 상태로 남아있다. 이 글의 목적은 오래된 증거의 문제가 베이즈적 입증 개념에 대한 심각한 오해에서 비롯되었다는 점을 보임으로써 그 문제를 해결하는 것이다. 먼저 논의의 출발점인 오래된 증거의 문제가 분석되고 이어서 베이즈주의자들이 그 문제를 해결하기 위해서 제안한 두 가지의 대표적 입장이 비판적으로 검토된다. 이러한 과정을 통하여 오래된 증거의 문제에 대한 기존의 논의들에서 공통적으로 발견되는 오해, 즉 설명과 예측의 맥락에서 나타나는 입증의 비대칭성이 무시되는 현상이 지적된다. 마지막으로 입증의 비대칭성을 이용하여 두 종류의 구별되는 베이즈적 입증 개념이 제시되고 오래된 증거의 문제에서 가정된 입증은 진정한 입증이 아니라는 점이 주장된다.
Abstract
The old evidence problem raises a profound problem to Bayesian theory of confirmation that evidence known prior to a hypothesis explaining it cannot give any empirical support to the hypothesis. The old evidence problem has resisted to a lot of trials to solve it. The purpose of the paper is to solve the old evidence problem by showing that the problem originated from a serious misunderstanding about the Bayesian concept of confirmation. First, I shall make a brief analysis of the problem, and examine critically two typical Bayesian strategies to solve it. Second, I shall point out a misunderstanding commonly found among Bayesian discussions about the old evidence problem, the ignorance of the asymmetry of confirmation in the context of explanation and prediction. Lastly, I shall suggest two different concepts of confirmations by using the asymmetry and argue that the concept of confirmation presupposed in the old evidence problem is not a genuine Bayesian concept of confirmation.
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