Kripke vs. Wittgenstein on the Notion of Rule-following and Semantic Contextualism
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In this paper, I argue that it is Kripke’s Tractarian notion of rule-following that prevents him from giving a non-skeptical (straight) solution to Wittgenstein’s paradox. I characterize the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the ‘determinate/infinistic’ notion of rule-following. The later Wittgenstein, however, advocates an opposite notion of rule-following: the ‘indeterminate/finistic’ notion. Considering the later Wittgenstein’s context-sensitive, pragmatics-oriented approach to meaning and rule-following, the later Wittgenstein could not have endorsed the determinate/infinistic notion of rule-following. To the contrary, a motive behind Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox was to blame the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the major culprit giving rise to the paradox. At the end, I argue that Kripke’s adherence to the Tractarian-correspondence theory of truth also contributes to his failure to offer a non-skeptical solution to the paradox. If Kripke had noticed that the later Wittgenstein was a deflationist about truth, he could have avoided his skeptical conclusion.
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that it is Kripke’s Tractarian notion of rule-following that prevents him from giving a non-skeptical (straight) solution to Wittgenstein’s paradox. I characterize the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the ‘determinate/infinistic’ notion of rule-following. The later Wittgenstein, however, advocates an opposite notion of rule-following: the ‘indeterminate/finistic’ notion. Considering the later Wittgenstein’s context-sensitive, pragmatics-oriented approach to meaning and rule-following, the later Wittgenstein could not have endorsed the determinate/infinistic notion of rule-following. To the contrary, a motive behind Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox was to blame the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the major culprit giving rise to the paradox. At the end, I argue that Kripke’s adherence to the Tractarian-correspondence theory of truth also contributes to his failure to offer a non-skeptical solution to the paradox. If Kripke had noticed that the later Wittgenstein was a deflationist about truth, he could have avoided his skeptical conclusion.
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