양진주의에서의 폭파원리와 사소성에 대한 거부
The Rejection of The Principle of Explosion and Triviality in Dialetheism
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초록
필자는 폭파원리와 사소성에 대한 양진주의자들의 거부가 성공적이지 못함을 보일 것이다. 이러한 필자의 논의는 기본적으로 타당성에 대한 과대결정과 관련된다. 고전적 메타언어에 기초하면 타당성에 대한 과대결정은 해소되지만, 복수문제와 ‘모순’의 의미에 대한 임의적 수정이라는 비판이 성립하는 반면, 비고전적 메타언어에 기초하면 모순의 수용과 사소성에 대한 배타적 거부가 동시에 만족되지 않는다는 것이다. 그리고 이것은 양진주의를 수용하기 어렵다는 것을 보여준다. 고전적 메타언어를 선택하든 비고전적 메타언어를 선택하든 수용하기 어려운 결과가 함축되기 때문이다.
Abstract
This paper will discuss how dialetheists cannot effectively reject the principles of explosion and triviality. Our discussion is related to the overdetermination of validity. When based on classical metalanguage, the overdetermination of validity is resolved, yet it gives rise to revenge problems and invites criticism as an arbitrary modification concerning the meaning of 'contradiction.' In contrast, acceptance of contradictions and exclusive denial of triviality are not simultaneously satisfied when based on non-classical metalanguage. It demonstrates the difficulty of accommodating dialetheism. Regardless of the metalanguage used, the problems that make it challenging to accommodate dialetheism arise.
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