도덕성 강화에 대한 덕윤리적 비판―도덕성과 도덕판단에 대한 분석을 중심으로

Abstract

This article aims to identify ethical implications raised by the current and emerging forms of moral enhancement by neurotechnologies. More specifically, this study calls in question the legitimacy of moral enhancement project. This project suggests the possibility to control human behavior through technological means. Neural moral enhancement emphasize the central role of emotions over reasoning as a source of moral enhancement. But in this paper, I will argue that moral enhancement by neurotechnologies is not entirely comprehensive of the nature of morality and the capability of moral agent. This study is organized as follows. The first section clarifies the role of emotions and reason in moral philosophy based upon aristotelian analysis on virtues of thought. Moral emotions and reasoning are two different mental processes during moral judgement. They work in synergy and reciprocally influence each other. Phronesis(Practical wisdom) requires deliberation. To deliberate on moral questions demands a particular vision of human flourshing based on the autonomy of the moral agent. Thus, the control and manipulation of moral emotions by technological means reduce and threaten the essence of moral agency, that is autonomy. The second section summarize MacIntyre's critique of emotivism and show its relevance to an assessment of neural moral enhancement. The transhumanist hope to achieve a total manipulation of emotions, and an improvement of human character implies moral neutrality. Accoding to MacIntyre, this neurality is illusionary. Each individual orders his life according to a set of practices that implies particular ends or goods within a social order. The morality always presupposes rationality situated in a particular social enviornment. In the process of developing as a moral agent, each individual goes through a process of learning, making mistakes, correcting those mistakes and so moving towords the achievement of excellence. The conclusion can be briefly stated as follows. Moral agents are not engineered but trained through the development of a vision of the good life and an understanding of human flourishing. Thus, moral enhancement by neurotechnologies is a one-dimensional conceptualization of moral agency that does not reflect the fullness of human morality.