비대칭 권력구조 하에서의 양면게임: 한국·미국·EC간 농산물협상 비교

Abstract

Two-level game model provides a useful framework in analyzing and explaining the linkage between international politics of negotiation and domestic politics of its ratification. However, two-level game model as elaborated by Robert Putnam and else has an inherent shortcoming that regards power relations between negotiating states as equal and given. By doing so, it misses the real processes and outcomes of international egotiations under power asymmetry. This study considers power symmetry/ asymmetry as an important variable in two-level game. It further figures out distinctive linkages between ‘negotiation’ and ‘ratification’ depending on power relations of negotiating states: choice-game dominant v.s. structural coercion game dominant. Finally it also attends to distinctive influences of political rationality and economic rationality on egotiating states’ sizes of win-set depending on power relations. After refining simple two-level game into an ‘interactive two-level game’ and a ‘unidirectional twolevel game’ according to power symmetry/asymmetry, this study verifies theoretical issues through the comparative analysis of the agricultural negotiations between the US, EC, and South Korea.