An Evidence-Based Critique of Intention Cognitivism
2
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
“Intention Cognitivism” (IC) refers to a family of theories concerning the relation between the concepts of intention and belief. While there are important differences between the various theories that belong to this family, each is committed to the idea that an agent intends to X only if they believe that they (probably) will X. In this article I argue against this core commitment of IC on the basis of recent experimental evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of English use the concepts of intention and belief. After summarizing some of this evidence, I consider a possible defense of IC, one based on the distinction between full versus partial intentions and beliefs. I report on a new study that was conducted specifically to evaluate this defense of IC, the results of which indicate that this distinction fails to protect IC against the compelling empirical evidence against it. Additionally, I consider, and argue against, two recent arguments for IC.
Abstract
“Intention Cognitivism” (IC) refers to a family of theories concerning the relation between the concepts of intention and belief. While there are important differences between the various theories that belong to this family, each is committed to the idea that an agent intends to X only if they believe that they (probably) will X. In this article I argue against this core commitment of IC on the basis of recent experimental evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of English use the concepts of intention and belief. After summarizing some of this evidence, I consider a possible defense of IC, one based on the distinction between full versus partial intentions and beliefs. I report on a new study that was conducted specifically to evaluate this defense of IC, the results of which indicate that this distinction fails to protect IC against the compelling empirical evidence against it. Additionally, I consider, and argue against, two recent arguments for IC.
참고문헌 (24)
- Anscombe, E., "Intention" (1957), Basil Blackwell
- Audi, R., "Intending", Journal of Philosophy, 70, pp.387~402 (1973)
- Beardsley, M., "Values and Morals", pp.163~184 (1978), Reidel
- Bratman, M., "Two faces of intention", The Philosophical Review, 93, pp.375~405 (1984)
- Bratman, M., "Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason" (1987), Harvard University Press
- Buckwalter, W., "Impossible intentions", American Philosophical Quarterly, 58(4), pp.319~332 (2021)[DOI]
- Clark, P., "Intentions, intending, and belief : non-inferential weak cognitivism", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 101, pp.308~327 (2020)
- Davidson, D., "Intending, in Essays on Actions and Events", pp.83~102 (1980), Oxford University Press
- Davis, W., "A causal theory of intending", American Philosophical Quarterly, 21(1), pp.43~54 (1984)
- Gillessen, J., "Flat intentions – crazy dispositions", Philosophical Explorations, 20(1), pp.54~69 (2017)
- Grice, H. P., "Intention and Uncertainty", The Proceedings of the British Academy, 57, pp.263~279 (1971)
- Harman, G., "Change in View : Principles of Reasoning" (1986), MIT Press
- Hauthaler, N., "Strong cognitive weaknesses", Analytic Philosophy, pp.1111~ (2022), Advance online publication[DOI]
- Holton, R., "Willing, Wanting, Waiting" (2009), Clarendon Press
- Kane R., "The Significance of Free Will" (1998), Oxford University Press
- Levy, Y., "Why cognitivism?", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48(2), pp.223~244 (2017)
- Marušić, B., "Intending is believing : a defense of strong cognitivism", Analytic Philosophy, 59(3), pp.309~340 (2018)
- McCann, H., "Settled objectives and rational constraints", American Philosophical Quarterly, 28, pp.25~36 (1991)
- McGuire, J., "Is there a confidence condition in the concept of intention", Philosophical Psychology, 33(5), pp.705~730 (2020)
- Mele, A., "Springs of Action : Understanding Intentional Behavior" (1992), Oxford University Press
- Paul, S., "How we know what we are doing", Philosopher’s Imprint, 9(11), pp.1~24 (2009)
- Setiya, K., "Reasons without Rationalism" (2007), Princeton University Press
- Thompson, Michael, "Life and Action" (2008), Harvard University Press
- Velleman, J. D., "Practical Reflection" (1989), Princeton University Press