Transaction Costs and Institutionalized Cooperation in Transnational Rivers
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We often witness a substantial difference in the way international cooperations are achieved in transboundary rivers. We take cases of the Rhine and the Mekong rivers to explain what factors cause such differences between the two rivers in international cooperation. To cope with the tragedy of the commons, riparian countries of each river have developed so unique and differentiated institutions (or regimes) to minimize transboundary damages or externality in the use of commonly shared water. We argue that such differences in institutionalization are the outcomes of endeavors of each region's riparian actors to economize transaction costs. Extending the traditional transaction cost dichotomy of market vs. hierarchy, we propose a conceptual model, in which we can select between ad-hoc consultation vs. an institution in the intergovernmental cooperation. It posits that transaction costs are the key in determining which mode is preferred to the other. Based upon Keohane and Gilligan's insights on implications of transaction costs theory on international relations, we focus on different kinds of transaction cost determinants such as issue density, sovereignty, regional hegemony, and heterogeneity in explaining institutions to govern transboundary river cooperation. Together with the well-known determinants of transaction costs,such as asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty, these newly recognized attributes turn out to be effective in showing how and why two regions so differin modes they govern the internationally shared rivers. Based upon our findings,we argue that the Rhine regime looks like an institution whereas the Mekong one looks like an ad-hoc consultation.
Abstract
We often witness a substantial difference in the way international cooperations are achieved in transboundary rivers. We take cases of the Rhine and the Mekong rivers to explain what factors cause such differences between the two rivers in international cooperation. To cope with the tragedy of the commons, riparian countries of each river have developed so unique and differentiated institutions (or regimes) to minimize transboundary damages or externality in the use of commonly shared water. We argue that such differences in institutionalization are the outcomes of endeavors of each region's riparian actors to economize transaction costs. Extending the traditional transaction cost dichotomy of market vs. hierarchy, we propose a conceptual model, in which we can select between ad-hoc consultation vs. an institution in the intergovernmental cooperation. It posits that transaction costs are the key in determining which mode is preferred to the other. Based upon Keohane and Gilligan's insights on implications of transaction costs theory on international relations, we focus on different kinds of transaction cost determinants such as issue density, sovereignty, regional hegemony, and heterogeneity in explaining institutions to govern transboundary river cooperation. Together with the well-known determinants of transaction costs,such as asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty, these newly recognized attributes turn out to be effective in showing how and why two regions so differin modes they govern the internationally shared rivers. Based upon our findings,we argue that the Rhine regime looks like an institution whereas the Mekong one looks like an ad-hoc consultation.
참고문헌 (44)
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