중간자 PLC를 이용한 CPS 은닉형 공격 실험환경 구축 방안
An Experimental Environment for Simulation of Stealthy Deception Attack in CPS Using PLCitM (PLC in the Middle)
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
사이버 물리 시스템(CPS: Cyber-Physical System)은 물리시스템과 사이버시스템이 통합되어 운영되는 시스템을 말한다. CPS는 대상 물리시스템을 안정적으로 운영하기 위해 다수의 센서를 이용하여 끊임없이 물리 대상을모니터링하고 현재 상태에 따라 액추에이터 제어를 수행한다. 만약 악의적인 공격자가 자신들의 공격을 은닉하기 위해서 센서들의 측정값을 대상으로 위변조 공격을 수행한다면, 수집된 데이터에 기반하여 운영되는 사이버시스템은현재 물리시스템의 운영 현황을 확인할 수 없게 된다. 이는 자동화 시스템 및 운전원의 대응을 지연시켜 더욱 큰 피해가 발생하게 된다. 점차 정교해지는 타겟형 공격들로부터 CPS를 안전하게 보호하기 위해서는 센서 및 측정값을대상으로 수행되는 은닉형 공격을 탐지할 수 있는 대응기술을 개발해야 한다. 그러나 다양한 이기종 장치들이 존재하는 CPS에서 실제 현장장치들을 대상으로 취약점을 분석하고 실증하는 과정은 많은 시간을 필요로 한다. 따라서본 연구에서는 CPS 은닉형 공격 탐지 기술의 성능 검증에 활용 가능한 중간자 PLC 실험환경 구축 방안을 제안하고 그 실험결과를 제시한다.
Abstract
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is a system in which a physical system and a cyber system are strongly integrated. In orderto operate the target physical system stably, the CPS constantly monitors the physical system through the sensor andperforms control using the actuator according to the current state. If a malicious attacker performs a forgery attack on themeasured values of the sensors in order to conceal their attacks, the cyber system operated based on the collected data cannot recognize the current operation status of the physical system. This causes the delay of the response of the automationsystem and the operator, and then more damage will occur. To protect the CPS from increasingly sophisticated and targetedattacks, countermeasures must be developed that can detect stealthy deception attacks. However, in the CPS environmentcomposed of various heterogeneous devices, the process of analyzing and demonstrating the vulnerability to actual fielddevices requires a lot of time. Therefore, in this study, we propose a method of constructing the experiment environment ofthe PLCitM (PLC in the middle) which can verify the performance of the techniques to detect the CPS stealthy deceptionattack and present the experimental results.
참고문헌 (13)
- C.M. Ahmed, "Model-based Attack Detection Scheme for Smart Water Distribution Networks", Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp.101~113 (2017)
- D.F. Kune, "Ghost Talk: Mitigating EMI Signal Injection Attacks against Analog Sensors", IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp.145~159 (2013)
- M. Krotofil, "The Process Matters: Ensuring Data Veracity in Cyber-Physical Systems", Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, pp.133~144 (2015)
- M. Krotofil, "Vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems to stale data-Determining the optimal time to launch attacks", International journal of critical infrastructure protection, 7(4), pp.213~232 (2014)[DOI]
- S. Amin, "Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems-Part I: Analysis and Experimentation of Stealthy Deception Attacks", IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, 21(5), pp.1963~1970 (2013)[DOI]
- S. Amin, "Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems-Part II: Attack Detection Using Enhanced Hydrodynamic Model", IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, 21(5), pp.1679~1693 (2013)[DOI]
- Y. Shoukry, "PyCRA: Physical Challenge-Response Authentication For Active Sensors Under Spoofing Attacks", Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp.1004~1015 (2015)
- Y Mo, "Physical Authentication of Control Systems: Designing Watermarked Control Inputs to Detect Counterfeit Sensor Outputs", IEEE Control Systems, 35(1), pp.93~109 (2015)
- N Falliere, "W32.Stuxnet Dossier. v1.4", Symantec Security Response, ~ (2011)
- R.M. Lee, "Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid, SANS ICS Defense Use Cases", ~ (2016)
- C. Kwon, "Security Analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems against Stealthy Deception Attacks", 2013 American Control Conference (ACC) (2013)
- "Library of General Functions (LGF) for S7-1200/1500"[URL]
- I. Ruchkum, "Eliminating Inter-Domain Vulnerabilities in Cyber-Physical Systems: An Analysis Contracts Approach", Proceedings of the First ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems-Security and, 2015, 11~22