NCC/MQ-Sign에 대한 비밀키 복구 부채널 분석
Key Recovery Side-Channel Analysis on NCC/MQ-Sign
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초록
양자 컴퓨터 시대가 다가옴에 따라 미국 NIST에서는 2016년도부터 양자 내성 암호 공모전을 시작했고, 국내에서도 2022년도부터 KpqC 공모전을 시작했다. KpqC 공모전은 현재 4종의 전자서명과 4종의 PKE/KEM이 후보로 선택되어 2라운드가 진행되고 있다. 양자 내성 암호는 양자 컴퓨터를 이용한 암호학적 공격을 대비하여 양자 알고리즘에도 안전한 기반 문제를 이용한 암호 알고리즘이지만 장치에서 암호 알고리즘이 동작하는 동안의 부채널 정보를 활용한 부채널 공격에는 여전히 노출될 수 있다. 따라서 안전한 양자 내성 암호 전환을 위해서 부채널 공격에 대한 취약성 검증과 대응기술 연구가 필요하다. 이런 이유로 NIST 양자 내성 암호 공모전의 후보 및 선정 알고리즘들은 많은 부채널 공격 및 대응기법 연구가 이뤄져 오고 있다. 이에 비해 KpqC 후보 알고리즘들에 대한 부채널 공격 연구는 아직 초기 상태이며 대응기법에 대한 연구 역시 미비하다. 본 논문은 KpqC 2라운드 전자서명 NCC-Sign과 MQ-Sign에 대한 비밀키 복구 부채널 공격을 제안한다. ARM-Cortex M4 기반 STM32F3 MCU 환경에서 각 전자서명 알고리즘을 동작시켜 수집된 5,000개의 전력 파형으로 비밀키 일부에 대한 복구에 성공해 제안한 공격을 실험적으로 검증했다.
Abstract
As the era of quantum computers approaches, the U.S. NIST has been conducting a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization project since 2016, and in Korea, the KpqC competition began in 2022. The KpqC competition currently has four digital signature algorithms and four PKE/KEM algorithms selected as candidates, and the Round 2 is in progress. PQC algorithms are designed to be secure against quantum computing attacks by using hard mathematical problems that remain safe even in the quantum era. However, they are still vulnerable to side-channel analysis (SCA), which exploit physical information leaked during the operation of cryptographic algorithms on devices. Therefore research on the evaluation of vulnerabilities to SCA and countermeasures is essential for a secure transition to PQC. Many SCA and countermeasures have been studied for NIST PQC candidate and selected algorithms. In contrast, research on SCA against KpqC candidates is still in its early stages, and studies on countermeasures are also lacking. This paper proposes secret key recovery SCA against two KpqC Round 2 digital signature algorithms, NCC-Sign and MQ-Sign. We performed experimental verification of the proposed attack by successfully recovering a part of secret keys using 5,000 power traces collected by working each digital signature algorithm in an ARM-Cortex M4-based STM32F3 MCU environment.
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