양자내성암호 NTRU에 대한 전력 부채널 공격 및 대응방안
Power-Based Side Channel Attack and Countermeasure on the Post-Quantum Cryptography NTRU
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초록
양자 컴퓨터의 계산 능력을 고려하여 설계된 양자 내성 암호 NTRU는 수학적으로 안전한 암호 조건을 만족하지만 하드웨어 구현 과정에서는 전력 분석 공격과 같은 부채널 공격 특성을 고려해야 한다. 본 논문에서는 NTRU의 복호화 과정 중 발생하는 전력 신호를 분석할 경우 개인 키가 노출될 가능성이 있음을 검증한다. 개인 키를 복구하는 데에는 단순 전력 분석 공격(Simple Power Analysis, SPA), 상관 전력 분석 공격(Correlation Power Analysis, CPA)과 차분 딥러닝 분석 공격(Differential Deep Learning Analysis, DDLA)을 모두 적용할 수 있었다. 이러한 전력 부채널 공격에 대응하기 위한 기본적인 대응책으로 셔플링 기법이 있으나 보다 효과적인 방법을 제안한다. 제안 방식은 인덱스별로 곱셈(multiplication)후 누산(accumulation)을 하는 것이 아니라 계수별로 누산 후 덧셈만 하도록 함으로써 곱셈 연산에 대한 전력 정보가 누출되지 않도록 하여 CPA 및 DDLA 공격을 방어할 수 있다.
Abstract
A Post-Quantum Cryptographic algorithm NTRU, which is designed by considering the computational power of quantum computers, satisfies the mathematically security level. However, it should consider the characteristics of side-channel attacks such as power analysis attacks in hardware implementation. In this paper, we verify that the private key can be recovered by analyzing the power signal generated during the decryption process of NTRU. To recover the private keys, the Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and Differential Deep Learning Analysis (DDLA) were all applicable. There is a shuffling technique as a basic countermeasure to counter such a power side-channel attack. Neverthe less, we propose a more effective method. The proposed method can prevent CPA and DDLA attacks by preventing leakage of power information for multiplication operations by only performing addition after accumulating each coefficient, rather than performing accumulation after multiplication for each index.
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