1972년 中美 화해에 대한 “소련위협원인론”의 재고찰: 미-중-소 전략적 삼각관계 하의 중국 외교
Historical Reappraisal of the “Soviet Threat Theory” on the Sino-U.S. Rapprochement and China’s Diplomacy under the U.S.-China-USSR Strategic Triangle
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1972년 2월 28일 발표된 상해공동성명(上海公報)으로 대표되는 中美 화해는 미-소 양극 구조의 근본적 변화를 알리는 냉전의 중요한 전환점이었다. 중미 화해에 대한 대부분의 기존 논의들은 “소련의 위협(Soviet Threat)”이라는 공동의 위협에 대항하기 위해 중국과 미국 양국이 화해를 하였다고 주장하였고, 이는 “거의 자명한 이치”로 받아들여졌다. 이러한 “자명한 이치”는 국제정치에서 세력균형의 좋은 예로 지목되면서 중국 연구자들을 비롯한 국제정치학자들의 확립된 견해로 자리 잡게 되었다. 그러나 탈냉전 이후 공산권 국가 문서에 부분적 접근이 가능해지고, 중미 화해 당시 미국의 주요 외교문서들이 비밀해제(declassify)되면서, 전통주의적 해석에 대한 의문이 제기되기 시작하였다. 본 연구는 탈냉전 이후 공개된 다국 사료(multi-national archives)들을 교차 분석하는 역사적 접근 방법(historical approach)을 채용하여, 1969년 중소 무력충돌부터 상해공동성명으로 中美화해가 이루어진 1972년까지의 중국 외교에 대한 분석을 시도한다. 본 연구는 1969년 중소 무력 충돌은 소련이 아닌 중국에 의해 계획되었고, 이후의 미중 양국 간 회담에서도 중국보다는 미국이 중국에 대한 소련의 위협을 강조하였음을 역사적으로 밝힌다.
Abstract
Sino-U.S. rapprochement, which is symbolized by Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on February 28, 1972, was one of the great turning points of cold war history. Most of the literature which has dealt with Sino-U.S. rapprochement argued that China reconciled with the U.S. in order to enhance its security against the threat from the Soviet Union and this explanation was accepted as “nearly a truism.” This “conventional wisdom,” moreover, was regarded as hard proof of the balance of power in international politics. This article tries to shed new light on the Sino-U.S. Rapprochement by analyzing recently declassified historical archives. Newly declassified American and former Communist Bloc countries’ primary and second archives falsify “Soviet Threat Theory” in three ways. First, Zhenbao/Damansky incidents in 1969, armed conflicts in series between PRC and USSR, was initiated by China, not by the Soviet Union. Contrary to Kissinger’s widely-held perception of the Soviet as an “aggressor,” armed conflicts at the initial state perpetrated by the PRC. Second, during the Sino-U.S. negotiations to rapprochement, China did not emphasize Soviet threat to China. On the Contrary, Kissinger and Richard Nixon tried to persuade Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong of the immediate possibility of a Soviet attack on China. Finally, during the secret negotiations between PRC and the U.S., the U.S. granted major concessions regarding Taiwan, without obtaining China’s concession regarding Viet Nam. “Soviet Threat Theory” argued that China’s negotiating position toward the U.S. was severely constrained by its relative insecurity vis-à-vis the Soviet threat; nevertheless, China gained more concessions from the negotiations with the U.S. Contrary to Kissinger’s widely-held perception of the Soviet as an “aggressor,” in initial stage armed conflicts perpetrated by the PRC. Second, during the Sino-U.S. negotiations to rapprochement, China did not emphasize Soviet threat to China. On the Contrary, Kissinger and Richard Nixon tried to persuade Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong of immediate possibility of a Soviet attack on China. Finally, during the secret negotiations between PRC and US, the U.S. granted major concessions regarding Taiwan, without obtaining China’s concession regarding Viet Nam. “Soviet Threat Theory” argued that China’s negotiating position toward the U.S. was severely constrained by its relative insecurity vis-à-vis the Soviet threat; nevertheless, China gained more concessions from the negotiations with the U.S.Contrary to Kissinger’s widely-held perception of the Soviet as an “aggressor,” in initial stage armed conflicts perpetrated by the PRC. Second, during the Sino-U.S. negotiations to rapprochement, China did not emphasize Soviet threat to China. On the Contrary, Kissinger and Richard Nixon tried to persuade Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong of immediate possibility of a Soviet attack on China. Finally, during the secret negotiations between PRC and US, the U.S. granted major concessions regarding Taiwan, without obtaining China’s concession regarding Viet Nam. “Soviet Threat Theory” argued that China’s negotiating position toward the U.S. was severely constrained by its relative insecurity vis-à-vis the Soviet threat; nevertheless, China gained more concessions from the negotiations with the U.S.
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