Analysis of Electronic Warfare Capability of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF): Its Impacts and Implications on Korean Security
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This paper analyzes the electronic warfare capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), established in 2015 in China. Based on the investigation, this paper aims to examine the impacts of electronic warfare capabilities of PLASSF on South Korea as well as the implications for Korean security. The core mission of the PLASSF is to perform space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare. Under the Network Systems Department of the PLASSF, the units for electronic warfare operates ground-based equipment, (un) manned aircraft, and electronic warfare satellites. Based on this fact, this paper argues the impacts of the PLASSF’s electronic warfare capabilities are threefold: First, the PLASSF’s manned electronic aircraft allows them to collect the electronic intelligence regarding the major military equipment not only of the Korean military but of the U.S. Forces in Korea. Second, it is also expected that the PLASSF would conduct electronic warfare activities very close to the Korean Peninsula by utilizing its unmanned stealth electronic aircraft. Third, the PLASSF is highly likely to gather signals intelligence from space via electronic warfare satellites. In this regard, it is necessary for the Korean military to 1) develop a more concrete concept of electronic warfare; 2) explore the ways to refuse China’s electronic information collection; and 3) secure the electronic warfare countermeasure weapons system.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the electronic warfare capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), established in 2015 in China. Based on the investigation, this paper aims to examine the impacts of electronic warfare capabilities of PLASSF on South Korea as well as the implications for Korean security. The core mission of the PLASSF is to perform space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare. Under the Network Systems Department of the PLASSF, the units for electronic warfare operates ground-based equipment, (un) manned aircraft, and electronic warfare satellites. Based on this fact, this paper argues the impacts of the PLASSF’s electronic warfare capabilities are threefold: First, the PLASSF’s manned electronic aircraft allows them to collect the electronic intelligence regarding the major military equipment not only of the Korean military but of the U.S. Forces in Korea. Second, it is also expected that the PLASSF would conduct electronic warfare activities very close to the Korean Peninsula by utilizing its unmanned stealth electronic aircraft. Third, the PLASSF is highly likely to gather signals intelligence from space via electronic warfare satellites. In this regard, it is necessary for the Korean military to 1) develop a more concrete concept of electronic warfare; 2) explore the ways to refuse China’s electronic information collection; and 3) secure the electronic warfare countermeasure weapons system.
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