North Korea’s Risk-taking vis-？-vis the U.S. Coercion in the Nuclear Quagmire
0
조회
0
다운로드
3
인용
0
참고문헌
초록
For more than a decade, the United States has tried to socialize North Koreainto a set of rules. But what if there exists a separate set of rules of the game forNorth Korea? It is highly probable that Kim Jong Il will move toward anothersuccession, which would lead him to prioritize his political survival to North Korea’ssurvival as the state. Whether Kim Jong Il’s political survival is threatened or notdetermines whether North Korea will cross the “red line” set by the United States.Whether or not North Korea’s cooperation will be elicited depends on how to make areward so clear and a threat so potent and credible. Rewards such as an economicpackage, food aid and energy supply or threats not to provide such rewards will notbe effective in eliciting North Korea’s concessions. Whether it would be reward orthreat, it should be directedtoward Kim Jong Il’s political survival.It is notable that North Korea abandoned tit-for-tat and acquiesced to return tothe Six-Party Talks when Washington dispatched F-117 stealth bombers to SouthKorea. After September 11 and the war in Iraq in 2003, North Korea appeared verysensitive to U.S. dispatch of F-117 stealth bombers. In 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007,the stealth bombers drove North Korea back to negotiations and yielded agreement.It is also notable that there was no presence of the stealth bombers in 2006 whenNorth Korea conducted missile and nuclear tests. North Korea’s nuclear quagmirethus implies whether or not a country with opaque nuclear capability moves todeclared nuclear status depends on the country’s risk-taking will and perceivedthreat of international sanctions.The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. XIX, No. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 5169.
Abstract
For more than a decade, the United States has tried to socialize North Koreainto a set of rules. But what if there exists a separate set of rules of the game forNorth Korea? It is highly probable that Kim Jong Il will move toward anothersuccession, which would lead him to prioritize his political survival to North Korea’ssurvival as the state. Whether Kim Jong Il’s political survival is threatened or notdetermines whether North Korea will cross the “red line” set by the United States.Whether or not North Korea’s cooperation will be elicited depends on how to make areward so clear and a threat so potent and credible. Rewards such as an economicpackage, food aid and energy supply or threats not to provide such rewards will notbe effective in eliciting North Korea’s concessions. Whether it would be reward orthreat, it should be directedtoward Kim Jong Il’s political survival.It is notable that North Korea abandoned tit-for-tat and acquiesced to return tothe Six-Party Talks when Washington dispatched F-117 stealth bombers to SouthKorea. After September 11 and the war in Iraq in 2003, North Korea appeared verysensitive to U.S. dispatch of F-117 stealth bombers. In 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007,the stealth bombers drove North Korea back to negotiations and yielded agreement.It is also notable that there was no presence of the stealth bombers in 2006 whenNorth Korea conducted missile and nuclear tests. North Korea’s nuclear quagmirethus implies whether or not a country with opaque nuclear capability moves todeclared nuclear status depends on the country’s risk-taking will and perceivedthreat of international sanctions.The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. XIX, No. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 5169.