은행 및 금융지주회사의 소유지배구조에 대한 연구 ―미국 및 독일에서의 역사적인 전개 및 입법론을 포함하여

Abstract

In this article, I started my argument from the US and German historial developments in the banking industry. Especially US banking history was valuable to get some hints of each regulatory scheme I decided to test in this article focusing on the issue of separation of bank and non-bank entities through limiting the purchasing and voting right by the non-bank entities to the banks. Whereas German banking history was used as an example to compare regulatory system and capital market structure of German with those of US. In Section III, theoretical analysis was made from opponents and proponents side with regard to the issue of separation of bank and non-bank entities. The speciality of banks are recognized and some reasons why separation is to be legitimated. However, still we have to go further to design our system in a more efficient and internationally competitive manner in conjunction with the preserving the special nature of bank and its functional basis such as safe and soundness and hub-function of Korean financial system with the spokes including other non-bank financial institutions. In section IV, 4 options were presented for the betterment of our current regulatory scheme of bank and financial holding company, a entry level ownership restriction. Agreeably, behavior based regulation can be and generally is to be understood as a better regulatory scheme, however, in our Korean case, the other legal infrastructures which will have to complement the vacuum happening at the time of abolishing and/or replacing current regulatory system are not yet to be built-in or insufficient in our legal system. Considering the discussions before and the slippery slope and regulation conversion cost, as sort of menu cost and current financial circumstances in Korea, my conclusion is that it would be better to stay as it is now with an room for debate to lessen the percentage of ceilings both in Bank Act and Financial Holding Company Act.