모범납세자에 대한 사후관리가 조세순응에 미치는 영향: 조건부 보상과 탈세 시 제재강화를 중심으로
Effects of Post Management for Honest Taxpayers on Tax Compliance: Focusing on Contingent Rewards and Strengthened Sanctions for Tax Evasion
0
조회
0
다운로드
1
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
[연구목적]국세청은 성실하게 신고하여 모범납세자로 선정된 납세자에게 우대혜택을 제공하는 제도를 운용하고 있다. 그러나 모범납세자로 선정된 후 혜택을 받는 기간 중 탈세를 하는 사례가 수년 동안 반복되어 제도의 보완이 요구되고 있다. 본 연구는 과세당국이 모범납세자에 대한 사후관리를 통해 납세자가 지속적인 성실신고를 유지할 경우에 한해 혜택을 제공하는 정책과 더불어 사후 적발 시 제재를 강화하는 정책이 전체납세자 및 모범납세자의 조세순응에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 추가로 모범납세자의 경우 모범납세자 선정 이후 탈세하는 사례가 보고되었으므로 선정 이후 조세순응에 미치는 영향을 분석하고자 하였다. [연구방법]본 연구는 웹기반의 실험을 통해 자료를 수집하였으며 실험참여자는 대학교에서 세무학 및 회계학을 전공하는 학생으로 한정하였다. 독립변수는 성실하게 납세한 성실납세자에 대한 혜택의 조건부 제공 여부와 혜택(세무조사면제) 제공 기간 중 탈세 적발 시 제재강화 여부이며, 집단별 요인으로 설계하였다. 종속변수는 실험참여자들의 세무신고의사결정으로 측정된 조세순응이며, 전체납세자의 경우 신고소득률, 성실납세자의 경우 신고소득률과 전기대비신고소득률차이로 측정하였다. [연구결과]분석결과는 모범납세자에게 세무조사유예 혜택을 제공할 때 사후관리를 통해 세금축소보고가 포착된 경우 혜택을 제공하지 않는 조건부 보상 정책이 전체납세자의 성실신고를 유도할 수 있음을 제시하였다. 또한 조건부 보상 정책은 모범납세자의 차기 소득 축소 보고 행태를 감소시킬 수 있음을 제시하였다. 반면 모범납세자로 선정된 이후 혜택 제공 기간에 탈세 행위가 적발된 경우 제재를 강화하는 정책의 성실신고 유도 효과는 확인되지 않았다. [연구의 시사점]이상의 연구결과는 현재 우리나라에서 지속적인 문제 제기가 나타나고 있는 모범납세자 제도는 사후검증과 관리를 강화하는 방향으로 이루어질 필요성이 있음을 제시한다.
Abstract
[Purpose]The Korean National Tax Service selects taxpayers who have paid taxes honestly to receive various rewards. This policy aims to improve tax compliance by increasing taxpayers’ trust in and cooperation with tax authorities. However, the continued detection of tax evasion by taxpayers recognized as honest indicates that an improved policy is needed. This study analyzes the effect of providing contingent rewards to honest taxpayers on the tax compliance of all taxpayers and honest taxpayers. Under this policy, taxation authorities provide rewards to honest taxpayers only if they continue to report taxes honestly post management. This study also analyzes the effect of strengthening sanctions for honest taxpayers who do not pay their taxes honestly during the reward period on the tax compliance of all taxpayers and honest taxpayers. In addition, the tax reporting behaviors of honest taxpayers are analyzed by period. [Methodology]The independent variables are whether to provide contingent rewards and whether to impose strengthened sanctions on tax evasion detected during the period of rewards (audit exemption), and the experimental design is manipulated between subjects. The dependent variable is tax compliance measured by tax reporting decision-making. For all taxpayers, the reported income rate is measured, while the reported income rate and the rate of change compared to the prior period are measured for honest taxpayers. [Findings]The results of the analysis suggest that the tax compliance of all taxpayers increases when a contingent reward is provided to honest taxpayers. In addition, the policy of strengthening sanctions on honest taxpayers who intentionally reduce taxes during the reward period did not affect tax compliance of honest taxpayers. [Implications]The findings of this study indicate that the system of rewards for honest taxpaers needs to be approached in terms of continuous post management rather than strengthened sanctions.
참고문헌 (39)
- 국세청, "2019년 모범납세자 우대혜택안내", ~ (2019)
- 심태섭, "세무대리업무 실무종사자의 성실세무신고 유도정책에 대한 효과분석", 회계학연구, 29(3), pp.227~252 (2004), 한국회계학회
- 심태섭, "세무조사와 성실납세자에 대한 혜택이 납세자의 세무신고에 미치는 영향", 경영학연구, 34(4), pp.1001~1022 (2005), 한국경영학회
- 배수진, "성실납세자 혜택은 조세순응을 유도 하는가: 조건별 보상여부와 혜택 유형을 중심으로", 회계학연구, 42(4), pp.141~175 (2017), 한국회계학회[DOI]
- 배수진, "제재와 보상이 조세순응에 미치는 영향", 세무학연구, 28(1), pp.437~480 (2011), 한국세무학회
- Alm, J., "Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement", pp.311~329 (1992), University of Michigan Press
- Alm, J., "Estimating the determinants of taxpayer compliance with experimental data", National Tax Journal, 45(1), pp.107~114 (1992)
- Alm, J., "Why do people pay taxes?", Journal of Public Economics, 48(1), pp.21~38 (1992)
- Alm, J., "Audit certainty, audit productivity, and taxpayer compliance", National Tax Journal, 59(4), pp.801~816 (2006)
- Baldry, J, "Income tax evasion and the tax schedule : Some experimental results", Public Finance, 42, pp.357~383 (1987)
- Bazart. C, "Fighting income tax evasion with positive rewards", Public Finance Review, 39(1), pp.124~149 (2011)
- Beck, P. J., "Experimental evidence on taxpayer reporting under uncertainty", The Accounting Review, 66(3), pp.535~558 (1991)
- Becker, G. S, "Clime and punishment-An economic approach", The Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), pp.169~217 (1968)
- Brockmann, "Happy taxation: Increasing tax compliance through positive rewards?", Journal of Public Policy, 36(3), pp.381~406 (2016)
- Collins, J. H., "The taxpayer's labor and reporting decision: The effect of audit schemes", The Accounting Review, 66(3), pp.559~576 (1991)
- Falkinger, J., "Reward versus penalties : On a new policy against tax evasion", Public Finance Quarterly, 19(1), pp.67~79 (1991)
- Feld, L. P, "Tax compliance as the result of psychological tax contract : The role of incentives and responsive regulation", Law & Policy, 29, pp.102~120 (2007)
- Fischer, C., "Detection probability and taxpayer compliance:A review of the literature", Journal of Accounting Literature, 11, pp.1~46 (1992)
- Friedland, N., "A simulation study of income tax evasion", Journal of Public Economics, 10(1), pp.107~116 (1978)
- Gangl, K., "Tax authorities' interaction with taxpayers : A conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trust", New Ideas in Psychology, 37, pp.13~23 (2015)
- Hite, P. A, "An investigation of moral suasion and vertical equity arguments on intended taxpayer noncompliance", LAW & POLICY, 19(1), pp.1~22 (1997)
- Houston, J., "A survey of tax evasion using the randomized response technique", Advances in Taxation, 13, pp.69~94 (2001)
- Jackson, B. R., "Influencing taxpayer compliance through sanction threat or appeals to conscience", Advances in Taxation, 2, pp.131~147 (1989)
- Kastlunger. B, "What goes around comes around? Experimental evidence of the effect of rewards on tax compliance", Public Finance Review, 39(1), pp.150~167 (2011)
- Kirchler. E., "Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance : The"slippery slope"framework", Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, pp.210~225 (2008)
- Kogler. C., "Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance : Testing the assumptions of the slippery slope framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and Russia", Journal of Economic Psychology, 34, pp.169~180 (2013)
- Lepper, M. R., "The Hidden Costs of Reward: New Perspectives on Psychology of Human Motivation" (1978), Erlbaum
- Murphy. K, "The role of trust in nurturing compliance : A study of accused tax avoiders", Law and Human Behavior, 28, pp.187~209 (2004)
- Nuttin, J, "Reward and Punishment in Human Learning" (1968), Academic Press
- Park, C. G, "Examining the determinants of tax compliance by experimental data : A case of Korea", Journal of Policy Modeling, 25(8), pp.673~684 (2003)
- Richardson, M., "A taxonomy of the tax compliance literature : Further findings, problems and prospects", Australian Tax Forum, 16, pp.137~320 (2001)
- Slemrod, J., "Taxpayer response to an increased probability of an audit : Evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota", Journal of Public Economics, 79(3), pp.455~483 (2001)
- Spicer, M. W, "Tax evasion and heuristics : A research note", Journal of Public Economics, 26(2), pp.263~267 (1985)
- Spicer, M. W, "Audit probability and the tax evasion decision : An experimental approach", Journal of Economic Psychology, 2, pp.241~245 (1982)
- Torgler, B, "Beyond punishment : A tax compliance experiment with taxpayers in Costa Rica", Revista de Analisis Economico, 18(1), pp.27~56 (2003)
- Tyler. T. R, "2006 Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation", Annual Review of Psychology, 57, pp.375~400 (2006)
- Wahl, I., "Trust in authorities and power to enforce tax compliance: An empirical analysis of the “Slippery Slope Framework.”", Law &Policy, 32(4), pp.383~406 (2010)
- Wartick, M. L., "Reward dominance in tax-reporting experiments : The role of context", The Journal of American Taxation Association, 21(1), pp.20~31 (1999)
- Webley, P, "Audit probabilities and tax evasion in a business simulation", Economics Letters, 25, pp.267~270 (1987)
