王龍溪「見在良知」釋疑

Abstract

Wang Longxi (Ji, 1498-1583) was the most original Confucian among the scholars in Yangming School. Not only did he adequately understand Wang Yangmings (Shouren, 1472-1528) teaching of zhiliangzhi, he advocated the philosophical ideas of siwu and xianzailiangzhi in accordance with Yangmings thoughts. Longxis emphasis of xianzailiangzhi, however, triggered a heated debate, in discussions amongst both scholars of the mid-Ming Dynasty and scholars of contemporary times-a consensus never having been achieved. This article focuses on the discussions of the philosophical meaning of the concept of xianzailiangzhi, based on the criticisms of two of Longxis Confucian contemporaries, Nie Shuangjiang (Bou, 1487-1563) and Luo Niean (Hongxian, 1504-1564), as well as the interpretations of some contemporary scholars (Mou Zongsan, Wang Caigui, Wu Zhen and Peng Guoxiang). I will investigate the meaning and the significance of Longxis xianzailiangzhi and clarify some misunderstandings. This article argues that Longxis idea of xianzailiangzhi originated from the thoughts of Mencius and Yangming. In addition to its nature of a priori and spontaneous presentation, Longxi emphasizes that, as a purest moral feeling and primordial clear moral consciousness, xianzailiangzhi is an a priori consciousness that every human possesses. Xianzailiangzhi appears naturally and with immediacy. The dynamics of its moral practice is also immediately sufficient. Therefore, although the a priori xianzailiangzhi presents itself in the empirical world, it is not a sensation or perception. Rather, it is a fact of reason. Xianzailiangzhi cannot be reduced to a quantitative concept, nor can it be said to lack practical force.