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상법상의 소수주주 축출제도 -소수주식 강제매수제도와 교부금 합병제도를 중심으로-

Squeeze-out or Freeze-Out of Minority Shareholders under the Korean Commercial Code

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주제분류법학

초록

This paper is intended to discuss the controversial issue of the system of Squeeze-Out or Freeze-Out. Squeeze-Out or Freeze-Out is a term referring to the compulsory acquisition of the stakes of a small group of shareholders from a joint stock company by means of cash compensation. In Germany, a pool of shareholders owning at least 95% of a company's shares has the right to “squeeze out” the remaining minority of shareholders by paying them an adequate compensation. This procedure is based on the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG). An alternative procedure is governed by Articles 327a-327f of the German Stock Corporation Ac (AktG), valid since January 1.st 2002. In the meantime, under the U.S. squeeze-outs are governed by State laws. For example, Delaware Corporation law permits a parent corporation owning at least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to merge with that subsidiary, and to pay off in cash the minority shareholders. The consent of the minority shareholders is not required. They are merely entitled to receive fair value for their shares. In Korea, now, the squeeze-out system is introduced in Articles 24 of 360 - 26 of 360 under the amended Korean Commercial Code. According to new articles of amended law, controlling shareholders who own 95%of the stock issued by a company Compulsory purchase the stocks of minority shareholders who have under 5% of issued stocks of the company, so that controlling shareholders can squeeze out minority shareholders. Thus, under the new scheme of Korean law, the issues of ensuring the fairness or justice related the protection of minority shareholders become controversial. The most important thing is to guarantee fairness under the legal system. Also, it is necessary to arrange systematic and effective methods for a protection of minority shareholders. It is time when we should reconsider its legal system with great interest in order to harmonize with the protection of minority shareholders.

Abstract

This paper is intended to discuss the controversial issue of the system of Squeeze-Out or Freeze-Out. Squeeze-Out or Freeze-Out is a term referring to the compulsory acquisition of the stakes of a small group of shareholders from a joint stock company by means of cash compensation. In Germany, a pool of shareholders owning at least 95% of a company's shares has the right to “squeeze out” the remaining minority of shareholders by paying them an adequate compensation. This procedure is based on the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG). An alternative procedure is governed by Articles 327a-327f of the German Stock Corporation Ac (AktG), valid since January 1.st 2002. In the meantime, under the U.S. squeeze-outs are governed by State laws. For example, Delaware Corporation law permits a parent corporation owning at least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to merge with that subsidiary, and to pay off in cash the minority shareholders. The consent of the minority shareholders is not required. They are merely entitled to receive fair value for their shares. In Korea, now, the squeeze-out system is introduced in Articles 24 of 360 - 26 of 360 under the amended Korean Commercial Code. According to new articles of amended law, controlling shareholders who own 95%of the stock issued by a company Compulsory purchase the stocks of minority shareholders who have under 5% of issued stocks of the company, so that controlling shareholders can squeeze out minority shareholders. Thus, under the new scheme of Korean law, the issues of ensuring the fairness or justice related the protection of minority shareholders become controversial. The most important thing is to guarantee fairness under the legal system. Also, it is necessary to arrange systematic and effective methods for a protection of minority shareholders. It is time when we should reconsider its legal system with great interest in order to harmonize with the protection of minority shareholders.

참고문헌 (47)

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